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An Ethical Interpretation of Tamagotchi
Annie O’Rourke
"Tamagotchi is more than a toy, it is a learning device. It  teaches 
people to be responsible - to care fo r  something - like a pet."
Mary W oodward, spokesperson fo r  Bandai Corp., U.S.Division1
"The real referent o f  the gismo is nature in its entirety reinvented 
in accordance with the technological reality principle - a total 
simulacrum o f  an automated nature."
Jean Baudrillard1 2
A prevailing sense of anxiety and ambiguity clouds my thinking when I think of the reality of virtual pets. What I feel towards them has been instrumental in the writing 
of this article, it has been a sticking point that has forced me to 
confront whether or not they really matter, and whether I care. 
Virtual pets are things I would rather did not enter my world, and 
yet they are here and have affected me and many others.3 This 
one small toy has opened up a space for a whole new generation 
of toys that are so called 'responsive' entertainment.
The launch of the virtual pet Tamagotchi was phenomenally 
successful, seemingly striking a combination of elements which 
sparked a feeling of its novelty. This novelty operated beyond the 
usual trajectory of wonder at the close proximity of its simulation 
of real life. Given that this toy (in its material manifestation) is 
relatively simple and seemingly benign, the key to interest in 
Tamagotchi resides elsewhere.
Tamagotchi is an electronic figure that represents a 'pet' on a 
small (lx l inch) screen. The screen is housed in an egg sized 
plastic mould that has about four control buttons which the
1 Mary Woodward quoted by Rebecca Eisenberg 'Bandai's Golden Egg', National 
Netly News, March 21, 1997.
2 Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects , Translated by James Benedict, (Verso, 
New York, 1996), p.116.
3 Tamagotchi has been an extremely popular, extremely 'faddish' game. The 
manufactures have sold 20 million worldwide. Added to this are the many 
'clones’ and other types of computer pets, a fast growing industry accelerated by 
the net.
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player uses to interact with the 'live' pet on the screen. The pet 
(the Tamagotchi) will periodically call (by beeping) its owner to 
feed it, play with it, give it medicine and occasionally punish it. 
The game involved is one of keeping the pet alive for as long as 
possible by finding the right combinations of inputs that ensure 
its general well-being. If it all goes wrong (as it did in my case) the 
'pet' will die, but you can get a new one by re-setting the program 
very easily. Although you have to be responsive to its needs, 
ultimately you have power over the life and death of this 'virtual' 
other, with no 'real' responsibility attached.
However, if we step back from the media and academic hyperbole 
surrounding 'the virtual' for a moment, we can start to see the 
various trajectories which make possible the arrival of such 
games as Tamagotchi. They have not arrived out of nowhere (or 
out of 'Planet Tamagotchi- somewhere in cyberspace' as Bandai 
Corp. have marketed). Computer games are rife, and ’animals' are 
more popular than ever.4 Put in the context of current lifestyles 
for the targeted group of consumers (of digitised, broken up time, 
high mobility, and a sense of individual ineffectiveness) 
Tamagotchi starts to make sense. Rather than just taking this 
sense as therefore being naturally meaningful, I seek to interrupt 
the trajectory and look more carefully at what and who is being 
affected by such inventions, and perhaps more interestingly, by 
their marketing. This article is thus an attempt to 'respond' to the 
phenomenon of virtual pets (especially the variety which 
launched the concept and the fad: Tamagotchi) beyond the 
confines of the game itself. Doing so is more than a one or two 
button push.
My approach has been hermeneutic,5 for the way in which virtual 
pets work (and are made meaningful) is through a complex 
process of interpretation, signification and imagination.
4 It is not that we are increasingly in contact with animals, rather, it seems that 
the opposite is true - the further away we are from them in an everyday sense, 
the more they are represented and consumed.
5 This hermeneutic approach has been informed by readings of Hans George 
Gadamer, Martin Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur. Specifically, I am interested in 
their unravelling of the process of interpretation into what Gadamer describes as 
a 'fusion of horizons' (a meeting of the contextual understanding of the 
interpreter with that of the interpreted). Hans George Gadamer, Truth and 
Method , Translated by William Glen-Doepel, (Sheed & Ward, London, 1975), 
pp. 273-274. For an overview of Twentieth century hermeneutic approaches to 
texts, see: Richard E Palmer, Hermeneutics, (North West University Press, 
Evanston, 1969).
2
Hermeneutics is involved in unpicking the processes of 
interpretation, it looks at the sites of mediation (for example, at 
texts) because the possibility of a pure experience of 'reality' is 
questioned.6 In order to uncover what is at stake with the 'virtual' 
mediated experience, we have to also look at what it is simulating 
more carefully, that is, at the concept of 'reality' that supports it.
The game Tamagotchi can be thought of as a 'text' which has a 
particular world that has been programmed into its computer.7 
The world of Tamagotchi is encountered by the interpreter (the 
player) who brings an 'historically operative consciousness'8 (a 
world) which shapes her or his interpretation and experience. In 
the interpretative encounter, a ’fusion of horizons’9 between 
these two worlds occurs, and a meaningful relation arrives. This 
is the ’effect' of Tamagotchi, the moment when its world moves 
out in front of the text itself into the field of life and action. It is 
through interpretation and imagination that the Tamagotchi 
housed in the plastic egg becomes meaningful as 'pet'.
The trajectory of this article follows the idea of 'worlding' and 
encounters between subjects and objects quite closely. In the break 
up of this text, I am mimicking a heuristic devised by Sandra
6 Paul Ricoeur in describing hermeneutics claims that it involves a 'general 
mistrust concerning the claim of any philosophy to reestablish the primacy of 
intuition, immediacy, as though we could have before us in our minds the pure 
presence of "what is" He then goes on to say that 'the word hermeneutics will 
be the task of the explication of all the symbolic systems which relate us 
indirectly to reality, whatever this reality may be. And this will be, I suppose, 
one of the stakes, that is, one of the ontological premises.' Charles E Reagan, 
’Interviews, 1982’ in Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work, (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1996), p.l.
7 The notion of ’world’ is central to a hermeneutic understanding of the process of 
reading and imagination. Richard Kearney describes hermeneutics as being 'not 
just confined to the objective structural analysis of the texts, nor to the subjective 
existential analysis of the authors of the texts. Its primary concern is with the 
worlds which these texts and authors open up.' Richard Kearney ’Paul Ricoeur 
and the Hermeneutic Imagination’ in T.Peter Kemp & David Rasmussen, eds.,
The Narrative Path: the Later works of Paul Ricoeur, (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1991), p. 6.
8 ’Historically Operative Consciousness’ (or ’prejudice) is the Gadamerian way 
of expressing what Heidegger terms a subject's 'forestructure', that is, the culture, 
history and language through which a subject learns to make the 'world' 
meaningful. Because of this 'making' the world can never be thought of as 
entirely outside the subject. For Gadamer's description of prejudice see Truth and 
Method, p.237.
9 The 'fusion of horizons' is a meeting of the contextual understanding of the 
interpreter with that of the interpreted. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 273- 
274.
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Schneiders in her feminist hermeneutic reading of the Bible.10 1
Here the complex interpretive moment is broken up into three 
worlds: the world of the text, the world behind the text and the 
world before (or in front of) the text. Section One (the world of the 
text) reads Tamagotchi as a text that has a structure and narrative 
that mimics the temporality we usually associate with 'life'. Here 
my research was taken from my own experience of the game as 
well as interviews with other people who have come into contact 
with Tamagotchi, most of these were primary school aged 
children. Section two will look at the world behind the text: that 
is, asking what it was that gave rise to the text and the 
relationship of these factors to the text itself. In the case of 
Tamagotchi I will focus specifically on the 'caring' relation it 
commodifies and makes virtual by drawing on its relations to 
children, pets, and computer games. Section Three looks at the 
world before the text, that is, the world that has shifted and 
changed as a consequence of the encounter between the 
interpreter and the text. As the marketed image of Tamagotchi 
claims, it is in fact a Teaming device'. But what exactly is being 
taught and leamt needs to be examined more closely and radically 
questioned by someone who 'cares’.
Section 1. The World of the Text:
The Consumption of Tamagotchi
"If you keep your Tamagotchi full and happy it will grow into a 
cute, happy, cyber creature. I f  you neglect it, it will grow into an 
unattractive alien." (Bandai Instruction Booklet)
"You don't just play with your Tamagotchi when you feel like it - 
it will let you know when it wants you. It will beep and cry for  
you, and its sounds will get louder and louder until you give it 
attention. I f you ignore it, Tamagotchi will misbehave, or die."11
In order to understand Tamagotchi the players have to enter into 
its world and be open to its meaning and structure. As readers of 
this text, we also have to be open to it so that we can ultimately 
uncover its ethical effects. Because I am interested in the ways in 
which Tamagotchi are interpreted and experienced, my research 
in this area has focused on my own experiences of the game,
10 Sandra M. Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament 
as Sacred Scripture (Harper, San Francisco, 1991).
11 Eisenberg, 'Bandai's Golden Egg'.
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interviews with children who either use them or know of them, 
and web based research (chat rooms, personal and company 
websites).
Although this game is eminently repeatable (you can simply press 
reset if your current 'pet' dies) it is not an experience I would 
personally wish to repeat. My ability to respond to its beeps (in all 
manner of contexts) lasted only a short time. After a while, I 
basically programmed it to 'sleep' (to minimise its beeps), and it 
died soon after. I pressed 'reset' and got a brand new pet, the last 
one was soon forgotten. This pet lasted slightly longer (I had 
learnt a few tricks), but ultimately it suffered a similar fate to the 
first. Is this a reflection on my poor ability to mother and nurture? 
Should I be feeling guilty? The context of my use of the game had 
almost completely pre-figured my experience of it - I was 
researching an article, I was already cynical, I did not 'believe'. But 
more than this, my ontological experience of the object made it 
very easy for me not to care, it is small and plastic, it is very easy 
to make it 'go away'. Nevertheless, I still did not feel entirely 
comfortable in admitting that I had let it die so easily, and the 
children I spoke to were appalled at my lack of remorse.
To believe in this object's 'life', one necessarily has to construct a 
kind of narrative around its existence. This narrative involves 
not only the game itself, but also your role in relation to it (ie as a 
mother or carer). Adults whose children were not allowed to take 
them to school were made into 'babysitters', and people who 
deliberately killed theirs were named on a number of websites as 
abusers' and 'torturers'. Virtual Pets mean very little in 
themselves (as figures on a screeen), it is their narrativisation 
(primarily in the head of the user) which makes them become a 
'pet' and forces a particular kind of behaviour.
Paul Ricoeur describes narrative as a grasping together of events 
to make a temporal whole.12 This 'grasping together' is an active, 
interpretative function of the imagination, and thus has to do 
directly with the 'worlding' of the interpreter. However, a certain 
openness towards the 'story' of the text must be given by the 
interpreter, and this means a willingness to follow the temporal 
and spatial dimension given by the text. There are certain rules, 
structures, and usually a strong temporal dimension which are
12 Richard Kearney 'Paul Ricouer and the Hermeneutic Imagination' in Kemp & 
Rasmussen, The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur, p.18.
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designed by the maker of the text (in this case the designers of 
Tamagotchi) with the user's experience and ability to interpret the 
text in mind.
Tamagotchi simulates an organic being by presenting something 
which is seemingly operating under its own temporality (it beeps 
at you when it wants you). It mimics the narrative most often 
ascribed to organic beings in the West, that of an inexorable 
movement from birth through to death. This trajectory is the 
familiar narrative structure of 'beginning, middle and end' as 
explicated by Aristotle.13 The designers of virtual pets have 
imitated this structure and made it into the game itself.
In the case of Tamagotchi, the 'game' is to keep the pet alive as 
long as possible. The responses which you can give to the 'cries' of 
the Tamagotchi are limited by the computer's program and 
number of button options (there are usually four buttons with 
sub-programs, so there are approximately 16 things you can 'do' to 
your Tamagotchi). Figuring out the rules of the program and your 
particular role is the challenge of the game.
Tamagotchi was first discovered in Japan. Tamagotchi 
hatch from tiny eggs after travelling millions of 
lightyears through cyberspace. With proper care and 
feeding (accomplished by pushing buttons on the eggs) 
Tamagotchi quickly grow into adorable virtual reality 
pets in a wide variety of shapes and personalities.14
Bandai have constructed the myth that Tamagotchi were created 
independently of their physical design and manufacture. The 
'world' from which Tamagotchi come from is imagined as 
completely immaterial, just as the pets themselves are also 
immaterial. Because you can 'reset' Tamagotchi and get a new 
one, the egg shaped casing is like a cage or nest in which you 
temporarily nurture the alien pet-creature. The origins and 
ontological experience of the this egg (as plastic and silicon) are 
completely erased by the mythology created by its marketing15 and 
by their wide interpretation as being 'virtual'.
13 J. Hillis Miller 'Narrative' in F, Lentricchia & T.McLaughlin, eds., Critical 
Terms for Literary Theory (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990), p. 66.
14 Bandai, Tamagotchi Home Page 1997
15 Jean Baudrillard in The System of Objects writes 'in order to consume it, the 
object has to first become a sign'. As I outlined at the end of section one, the user is 
consuming the idea of the animal and computer as pet.
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Once the egg has been hatched and the Tamagotchi is bom onto 
the screen it is now up to the user to Took after' it. One of the 
many websites offering helpful 'mothering' hints for Tamagotchi 
states:
Tamagotchi require lots of tender loving care, in the 
form of frequent feedings and attention. Hang on there, 
the baby stage doesn't last very long. They mature very 
quickly, one human day equals one Tamagotchi year.
The internal clock of the Tamagotchi mimics the different 
lifespans of 'real' pets as interpreted by humans. As a child, it was 
a source of continual delight to figure out the 'human age' of 
various pets in order to determine their relation to me (if they 
were older or younger, a child, teenager or old man).
Tamagotchi are programmed to change their weight, get older and 
eventually die.There is a 'handy' statistics measure (of happiness, 
hunger, health and weight levels) for the user to determine the 
relative doses of affection, punishment, food, play, sleep and 
medicine to give to the pet (through pushing various 
combinations of buttons). Can our relationships with pets be so 
easily characterised and simply programmed? Consider the 
following description of the human/pet relationship:
Like children, the animal must be cared for: fed and 
watered, kept from eating dangerous foods and objects, 
bathed, groomed, protected against the elements, 
clothed when necessary, brought to the doctors and 
spoken for at the doctors. Like children they are petted, 
stroked, and played with at the will of the owner, their 
range of motion being limited and sex life controlled.16
What this quote reveals is the connection between behaviour 
towards children (parenting and nurturing) and animals in the 
form of pets (which I will analyse in more detail in section two). If 
we use this same quote to think through the role that Tamagotchi 
has simulated we could just as easily substitute 'the animal' for 
'the Tamagotchi', the clever marketing and design of the machine 
by the manufacturers have almost taken such a description of the 
role of pet keeping practices and mimicked it with an electronic 
lifeworld interface. Tamagotchi reveals that what it is simulating
16 A.M. Beck. & A.H. Katcher, Between Pets and People (G.P.Putnam, New 
York, 1983), p. 60.
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is already somewhat programmed and constructed by our 
narratives. As will be further examined in section two, the 
relations of nurturance towards pets and children are naturalised 
by making them virtual, they are taken as the 'real' referent to 
which the virtual refers.
The creation of Tamagotchi does not just stop at the screen's 
image of the hatched egg, and the marketing of Tamagotchi does 
not stop at its point of purchase. The reasons for purchasing the 
Tamagotchi are often due to social pressure and a responsiveness 
to advertising. One eight year old girl told me that after she saw 
the ad on TV for Tamagotchi, she: 'had to have one because I love 
animals'. The connection between the sign of the animal and the 
game of the virtual pet had been successful and the purchase 
made. Another described the fad hitting their school with the 
following narrative 'It all started when Sophia's Dad went to 
Japan and brought her back a Tamagotchi. She took it to school, 
then everyone had to have one'. Those who I interviewed who 
did not personally own a Tamagotchi or virtual pet knew almost 
as much about them, they had entered the everyday folklore of 
the primary school.
Because it is small, it can be carried on the person everywhere. 
You are thus always responsible for it and have no real excuse for 
it becoming sick or dying. Addictive and obsessional behaviour 
towards Tamagotchi is encouraged by the very game itself which 
forces the user to re-enter its world intermittently throughout the 
day with its constant reminders for attention. A salesperson in a 
Sydney toy shop described them as 'initially quite addictive, but 
you eventually get sick of them and stop caring.' Many other 
interviewees and comments on web pages followed a similar path 
of desire, purchase, initial excitement, addiction and emotional 
attachment, then annoyance and finally detachment. Similarly, 
’real' pets only stay cute and appealing to humans for a short 
period of time. Once the initial novelty of the 'other' as young 
and manipulable wears off (they grow up and are sometimes then 
abandoned), the everyday chore of 'looking after' ceases to be so 
romantic.
The illusion of an organic 'other' was uncovered by one user as 
being nothing other than a strenuous alarm clock. He complained 
that when two friends set them at the same time, they then 
beeped and demanded at the same time for the rest of their
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'lives'.17 This, he deemed, was not responsive enough, the 
illusion or organicism was unmasked as a set program with 
minimal variables. One child at the primary school was excited by 
the promise that 'if you treat it well, it will live forever'. 
Unfortunately the confines of a two digit time system means that 
they have to in fact 'die' at 99 years (that is 99 days in human 
time), rather like the problem of the millennium bug. It is 
thought that most die within two weeks of their 'creation'.
You cannot simply turn it off. In order to end the game you have 
to 'kill' the Tamagotchi by neglect, or by bringing out of balance 
the various inputs at your disposal (feeding, punishing, medicine, 
bathing, pooh cleaning, making it sleep etc). The movement 
towards death that Tamagotchi imitate is a carefully constructed 
narrative both on and off the small screen. The image of death 
was changed by the manufacturer Bandai when it was released 
into the U.S. market. U.S. trial users were somewhat disturbed by 
the Japanese version of death which had an image of a cross and a 
gravestone. It was changed to an image of an angel, and the 
mythology of 'Tamagotchi land' and cyberheaven was elaborated 
upon in the booklet and websites. There is a 'Tamagotchi 
Graveyard' on the web where you can post your dead 
Tamagotchi's details (name, age, favourite habits) with a message 
to send to it in cyberheaven.18 The 'ritual exploration of life and 
death' (which according to Turkle is the function of playing with 
computer games19 as expressed through games such as 
Tamagotchi carries some fairly hefty emotional baggage. One user 
stated passionately: 'Those who say we feel no pain at resetting the 
game have obviously not raised a Tamagotchi on their own.'
And yet when the user is finally bored of the game, its material 
’death’ is not even noticed. All the emotional energy and interest 
is in the imaginary pet as represented by the small figure on the 
screen.
17 Glen McCrae, Don't Bother Buying a tamagotchi, Website, August 1997.
18 Most entries were concerned with expressing their love for the pet 'God bless 
Linda, I bet she's having fun up on planet Tamagotchi/, another repeated T’m 
Sorry' two hundred times, and someone else said 'To Devon my worst 
Tamagotchi, you will never be missed cause I hated you because you always 
beeped in the night even when I was trying to sleep, hope you go to hell and rot 
you little disgusting Tamagotchi.'
19 Turkle's thesis is that the use of computer games is to play with ownership and 
control over something which frightens us and is potentially beyond us (ie 
computers). She writes that 'the children allow the toy its most autonomous 
behaviour, and then, when it is most like a living thing, they kill it.' Sherry 
Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 1984), pp. 34 -38.
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One vehemently anti-Tamagotchi website (and there are a few) is 
called 'Smash Tamagotchi'. Its writers urged people to send their 
Tamagotchi to them with the promise that they will be smashed. 
Interestingly, the same writers later reflected that although they 
had had many 'hits' (visits to the web page) no one had actually 
sent them to be smashed. What this illustrates is that people do 
not actually think of Tamagotchi as material, the Tamagotchi 
creature is ephemeral and un-smashable. A neo-luddite response 
to Tamagotchi is clearly not an entirely appropriate reaction to the 
power of the virtual.
The narrative structure encountered in the world of the text is 
limited to the users immaterial experience of the Tamagotchi. 
The material life-span (or life cycle) of the object is concealed by 
this narrative. But this life-span, although concealed, is still 
present in an ontological sense. Although we may not be fully 
conscious of it, it designs our experiences, our ability to care and 
be responsive to the virtual creature.
None of the children I interviewed mentioned what had 
happened to the Tamagotchi object once they were sick of the 
game, it is almost as if it is not even 'seen'.20 Once the program 
had been figured out, the challenge of everyday care was 
eventually just too everyday. The initial shine of the virtual (in 
its proximity to the real) is dulled by its repetitious nature, much 
the same way as children (and adults) tire of pets once they are no 
longer young, cute and novel. Responses to the pet by the user 
(who after all exists in both the world of the text and outside of it) 
can be controlled, managed, and made to disappear. The 
imaginary which prompted the interest in the object has been 
consumed and the 'care' that Tamagotchi professes to teach is 
similarly abandoned.
There is a disjuncture between the world of the text in its 
imaginative realm and the world of the text in its ontological or 
material domain. The material waste produced by such fads is not
20 The children I spoke to at a primary school were confused by my questioning of 
what they did with them after they got sick of them. Most admitted that their 
Tamagotchi's had joined the other 'junk' and discarded toys in a cupboard or 
under the bed. They were much more interested in describing how they had 
gotten rid of the immaterial Tamagotchi through various methods of starvation, 
burying under pillows and turning the sound down so that they would 'not have to 
hear them die'.
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taken seriously; the waste of time (which also has material effects) 
can span anywhere from two days (in my case), to a couple of 
years. Although a Tamagotchi death is experienced as immaterial, 
its material reality (which has been concealed) forecloses our 
response to its worlding. It is the ontological/material experience 
of Tamagotchi which finally teaches us not to care about 
Tamagotchi's well being.
Section Two: The World Behind the Text
"What is said stands against the background o f the vast unsaid to 
which it is related."- Hans George Gadamer21
In order to understand the phenomenon of Tamagotchi we need 
to re-contextualise it into the life-world from which it arrived. 
Rather than getting carried away with its novelty (an approach 
which itself has an ethical effect22) I want to make apparent some 
of the different elements which make it meaningful. To do this in 
its entirety is an impossible task (for it will arrive to different 
people in a multitude of ways) but there are some dominant 
themes and discourses which can be deciphered as the nodal 
points from which Tamagotchi was configured. The elements I 
have identified are specifically related to the broader questions 
that I have brought to the text: that is care, ethics and a concern 
about virtual 'otherness'.
In order to uncover the unsaid or background that makes 
Tamagotchi meaningful, we have to look at the 'reality' that 
Tamagotchi is making virtual. This dynamic itself is not innocent 
however, it effects the elements that are being represented. It is 
my proposal that by making a 'virtual' version of a 'real' image or 
object, the reality status of that object becomes naturalised and 
fixed. The virtual, (which is defined as the 'almost' rather than 
the artificial - which is the 'fake'23) as a technologised entity,
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.456.
22 Gadamer writes 'What changes forces itself far more attention than what 
stays the same. That is the general law of our intellectual life. Hence the 
perspectives that come from the experience of historical change are always in 
danger of distortion because they forget the hidden constants.' (my emphasis) 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xiii.
23 Schirmarcher describes how the term 'artificial' (which implies the fake) 
has been replaced by the buzzword 'virtual' (which is the 'almost') in 
contemporary society. He writes 'This would certainly meet the much lesser 
expectations we have in this field nowadays: "almost" life, "almost" reality, 
"almost" intelligence would leave our traditional world view intact, merely
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makes possible a repeatable experience of the 'nature' it is 
replicating. To revisit the quote at the opening of this article by 
Baudrillard, the real referent outside of the virtual (ie nature) is 
actually re-invented as a simulacrum of an automated nature.
Tamagotchi contains a relatively simple computer program that is 
easily learnt. It arrives in a space whose occupiers are by and large 
computer literate, televisualised, urbanised and used to a certain 
quality of graphics and interactivity. The appeal of Tamagotchi 
cannot then be put down to a simple fascination with the highly 
technological. Its graphics and virtuality are similar to that found 
on a digital wrist watch or even on a calculator and come 
nowhere near being an 'almost' animal. The novelty and interest 
in Tamagotchi thus clearly resides elsewhere than the interface 
itself. In this section I will argue that it is the elements, discourses, 
boundaries and objects to which it refers which make it popular. 
These elements in themselves are not especially new or novel, 
indeed they are rather familiar, close and almost naive.
Heidegger argues that what is closest to us is precisely what is 
most hidden,24 so in the case of Tamagotchi, what has been 
capitalised on by the manufacturers is the very proximity of 
caring-for relations which are deemed necessary in our current 
culture and which are not usually associated with a computer 
interface. So it is the bringing together of a number of different 
realms (the animal /machine/ human, care and nurturance) into 
the one symbolic object which makes it so new and exciting.
The configurations from which Tamagotchi takes its meaning can 
be generally located within the domestic sphere: children, play, 
toys, pets and nurturance or mothering. Tamagotchi were 
supposedly created by a Japanese mother whose child could not 
have a real p et,25 and it was initially marketed to young Japanese 
girls. However, its popularity grew far beyond this group, 
transgressing the usual gender and age barriers for toys of its 
genre.
adding new layers to it.' Wolfgang Schirmacher, ’Homo Generator: Media and 
Postmodern Technology’ in G. Bender & T.Druckey, eds., Cultures on the Brink: 
Ideologies of Technology (Bay Press, Seattle, 1994), p. 67.
24 Paul Ricoeur uses Heidegger's thesis to explain why the distinction between 
what appears and what is hidden is not too sharp (this is in the context of 
explaining his use of both phenomenology and hermeneutics). Charles E. Reagan, 
’Interview with Paul Ricoeur June 19, 1982’ in Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996), p. 4.
25 Tamagotchi Website: Bandai Corp. 1997.
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It is worth staying with the marketed image of Tamagotchi for a 
while, for it is here that the connections to the 'real' world are 
most explicitly being forged. We have to be careful however, for 
marketing itself works in a similar way to the virtual. It creates 
and fixes the very market it is seeking to sell its product to. Like 
the virtual, it does not simply represent (and then satisfy) a 
consumer's previously unfulfilled desires. These images actively 
shape and mediate how the object or text is received and 
experienced.26
The marketing discourses of Bandai (the manufacturers and 
distributors of Tamagotchi) specifically work to solidify the idea 
that children can learn to act responsibly through being in contact 
with pets. Revisiting the opening quote of this article by a Bandai 
representative (It is more than a toy, it is a learning device...it 
teaches people to become responsible, to care for something, like a 
pet/) we can see how the phrase 'like a pet' grounds the claim that 
has just been made. It is assumed that by looking after an 'other' 
being, children learn an ethical and moral lesson of care. I do not 
doubt that a sense of morality or ethics is learnt from the contact 
between pet and child, but does it then follow that what is learnt 
is 'right' and 'natural'? What is being learnt is a culturally specific 
set of rules and moral codes of permissible behaviour.
Hegel situates the importance of the domestic setting as the site 
wherein ethics are formed in the subject.27 This realm has been 
overtly coded feminine and private and been demonstrated as 
such by feminist theory. In Western culture it has been somewhat 
locked out of the realm of public discourse and knowledge. 
Likewise reason has been privileged over passion and emotion,28
26 The media often later picks up on these marketed groups, using them to describe 
the current social milieu. For example Linda Lee writes of Western adolescents 
'why not just call them the Tamagotchi Generation? They like things 
technological and cute (like the 1995 movie Babe), they are open to the global 
marketplace and they insist on their right to irony. And unlike the electronic 
pets called Tamagaotchis, the Tamagotcheratis will never die as long as 
marketing people are willing to push their buttons/ Linda Lee 'Grunge gets the 
boot in bright new world of idoldom', The New York Times, March 13,1998, p.24.
27 Hegel's position is discussed in Selya Benhabib, ’The generalised and the 
concrete other’ in E. Frazer, J. Hornsby & L. Lovibond, eds., Ethics: A Feminist 
Reader (Blackwell, London,1992) p. 248.
28 Alison Jagger, ’Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology’, 
Inquiry , 32, 1989, p.151. This realm, and the bodies that support it (the mothers' 
bodies) are described as natural: childbirth and childrearing is assumed to be one 
of the most ’natural’ occurrences of the human condition. Many feminists have
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and the relation has been 'naturalised'. So we can start to see why 
Tamagotchi were initially marketed to young girls, because girls 
traditionally learn mothering behaviour through playing with 
dolls and mimicking their own mothers' nurturance and 
responsiveness to others. The fact that Tamagotchi have become 
popular beyond this limited category is perhaps testimony to the 
actual fluidity of these roles, that they are not grounded in a 
feminine bodily 'reality' of the capacity for childbirth, but are 
rather taught and learned behaviours.
Tamagotchi explicitly plays on and constructs its close proximity 
to the domestic. By making virtual a relation of nurturance and 
imitation (ie children pretending to be adults, especially mothers) 
what is simulating gets broken down into a manageable program 
of feeding, affection, health and punishment. The fact that it can 
be virtualised so easily is shocking partly because it is too close to 
what already occurs. As well as this the nostalgic idealisation of 
the domestic and nurturance is revealed to involve practices 
usually found in the public domain: that is time management 
and programming. The romanticised 'natural' realm of the 
private and domestic is shown to be easily replicated and made 
into a computer program.
Tronto describes the 'nurturance' most often acted by mothers as 
an ethical system based on the relation of ’caring-for’ another 
(which is in contrast to a masculinist public ’caring-about’ 
relation).29 In section three I will take up this idea of the 'caring-
challenged this status of the ’natural’ in relation to women and childrearing, 
identifying the discursive power relations that hold it in place as a dominant 
ideology. See for example E. Martin, The Woman in the Body: A Cultural 
Analysis of Reproduction , (Open University Press, London, 1987); Elizabeth 
Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
1994); and P. Treichler ’Feminism, Medicine and the Meaning of Childbirth’ in 
M.Jacobus et.al. eds., Body Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science 
(Routledge, London, 1990).
29 Joan Tronto, ’Women and Caring: what can feminists learn about morality from 
caring’ in A.M. Jagger &
S.R. Bordo, eds., Gender, Body, Knowledge: Feminist Constructions of Being and 
Knowing, (Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 1989), p.173. The strand of 
moral theory known as the ’feminist ethic of care’ stresses the exclusion of women 
from traditional Western moral theory as well as women's sense of morality as 
being less about abstract situations than caring for others around them. It hints 
towards an inter-subjectivity that displaces the traditional Western 
patriarchal ethical systems which emphasise the individual moral subject 
capable of making objective decisions from universal principles. See for example 
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's 
Development (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982).
14
for/about' in Tamagotchi to show that it teaches a 'caring-about' 
while simulating a 'caring-for' model of ethics.
The recognition of an 'other' as being outside of oneself reiterates 
an ethical model that is provided by Levinas, that of the 
recognition of finitude through the face of the other.30 It is 
particularly interesting to think through this notion of ethics in 
terms of the animal as 'other'. Recognition that the animal's 
world is outside of our complete comprehension and 
understanding does force the human subject to acknowledge their 
own finitude to some degree. What is questionable is whether 
this can occur in either the pet or virtual pet relation. Here the 
interpretations and encounters with the 'other' are already so 
prescribed and pre-figured that any 'otherness' is easily concealed. 
By responding to an 'other' that has been programmed by another 
human to call for you (ie the Tamagotchi), are we thus able to 
recognise our finitude and thus ethical situatedness? I would like 
to leave this larger question open.
The other-ness of the pet is often concealed by the common 
human treatment of the pet as a child. For example language that 
is spoken to both infants and pets has been referred to as 
'motherese'31). Thus the interpretation of the animal is not one 
that is totally open to the world of the other, rather it is a form of 
anthropomorphism that projects the subjects' identity onto the 
object. It has been argued that the ’cute response’ to many animals 
and pets is a kind of misplaced response to our own babies that 
illicit an innate desire to nurture and protect.32 This 'innate' 
desire is naturalised and made a necessary part of the grand 
narrative of human evolution. What is at stake in this discourse 
is the ultimate meaning and future of the 'human', any feelings
30 Levinas writes 'We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the 
presence of the Other, ethics.' Immanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity 
(Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1969), p. 43.
31 James Serpell writes 'People even talk to pets and children in similar ways. 
Psychologists have found that, in terms of structure, the manner in which people 
talk to their dogs strikingly resembles the specific kind of language, known as 
"motherese", which is adopted by mothers when talking to their infants.' James 
Serpel, In the Company of Animals: A Study of Human Animal Relationships, 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996), page 78.
32 Serpell attributes this idea to ethnologist Konrad Lorenz who compared the 
many different animals that elicit a cute response and showed their similarities 
to human infants. Similarly, Stephen Gould is quoted by Serpell as writing 'we 
are fooled by an evolved response to our own babies, and transfer our reactions to 
the same set of features in other animals', Ibid., p. 76.
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towards others outside of this boundary are denigrated as 
misplaced and sentimental.
As children, we play with toys and dolls by making them 'alive'. 
Similarly we construct a world of human reference for animals (a 
form of anthropomorphism) in order to interpret their 
behaviour. The boundaries implied by the term 
'anthropomorphism' (between human and the animal) are not 
necessarily realisable to the child, rather these boundaries are 
learned later. Midgely writes that children slip more easily 
between the world of humans and animals, the boundaries 
between them having not yet been fully learned.33 I would extend 
this observation to the division between the real and the artificial 
and virtual. As adults, we may ’know’ the rules in a formal sense, 
but our everyday relation to things suggests that the childhood 
animism I have identified may never be fully grown out of. Such 
animism could even be called a form of virtualisation or 
narrativisation, a world is constructed that is related to (but not 
quite) the one that is partly concealed. Our worlding and 
techniques of interpretation precede our very experiences of the 
object so that our encounter with it is meaningful.
If we add to this picture the boundary between the human and 
machine we can witness the high degree of anthropomorphism 
(behaviours such as talking to one's computer, responding to the 
television etc) that circulate beyond the domain of games. The 
toys that adults play with (cars, boats, computers, mobile phones) 
are just more complicated and expensive. Tamagotchi as 'virtual 
pets' reveal that the boundary between the animal and machine 
is only meaningful to the human. They play on these dynamics 
and uncertainties over boundaries, turning the 'animal' into the 
'machine', an image already prefigured by Descartes' influential 
image of the automaton. What Tamagotchi reveal to us is the 
way in which we already virtualise most of our relations with 
others'. By virtualising an already unsure distinction, 
Tamagotchi confuse our ability to make a clear moral judgement; 
the grounds on which such judgements are usually made have 
been shifted.
33Mary Midgely, 'The Mixed Community’ in E.C.Hargrove, ed., Animal Rights/ 
Environmental Ethics (State University of New York Press, New York, 1992), p. 
218.
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Section 3: The World Before the Text:
What can we learn from Tamagotchi?
As is suggested by the phrase 'the fusion of horizons', the complex 
processes of encountering and interpreting a text involves an 
activity of transformation. Something occurs in this encounter 
between the text and the reader (or the game and the player as in 
the case of Tamagotchi) which changes both of them. Ricoeur 
describes this as the world or story encountered in the text being 
appropriated, becoming part of the subject's own story or world. 
Because any encounter is situated within a complex field of 
relations, objects, meanings and their interconnections, it will 
have a number of different consequences perhaps not even 
immediately apparent. Ricoeur stated in an interview :
Interpretation is not limited to the boundary of the text. 
As soon as we raise the problem of appropriation or 
application, then we go out of the world of the texts and 
to the field of life and action. And then we are 
confronted by ethical questions and political questions.34
There has been much concern over the possible effects the 
'virtual' may have on the ’real’. Such concern expresses an 
anxiety over the possible replacement of the real by the virtual. 
For instance, Kruger asks: 'will real action lose its immediacy 
when it is but a replication of a simulated activity?'35 Though I too 
share in some anxiety over virtuality, what I have attempted to 
show is that the 'real' or 'immediate' is not only effected by the 
virtual, but is actually constructed by it. It is difficult to identify 
which one comes first for the virtual is anticipated in advance of 
our contact with it, then it actively constructs the world from 
which we supposedly come. This movement can be recognised as 
what is known as the hermeneutic circle.
Tamagotchi complicates the picture, because it is directly working 
on and fictionalising the world of praxis (ie by making a 'pet' that 
we have to respond to). However, we have to look beyond the 
confines of the game itself into the fields of its many 
consequences in order to see what political and ethical changes it 
is effecting. The term 'consequence' suggests a linearity (a cause 
and effect model) which conceals the more complex movements
34 Paul Ricoeur quoted in Reagan 'Interview 1982', p.10.
35 Myron Kruger, 'Foreword' to Michael Heim, The Metaphysics of Virtual 
Reality (Oxford University Press, New York, 1993), p. x.
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of 'worlding' that I have laboured to articulate in my analysis of 
Tamagotchi. Once we put Tamagotchi back into the everyday 
contexts of its use (ie in the overtly saturated universe of media, 
the virtual, images, objects, toys and the plethora of useless 
gadgets) we can start to see how the linearity suggested by 
'consequence' starts to become confused. Baudrillard writes: 'the 
anticipation of reality by images, the precession of images and 
media in relation to events, such that the connection between 
cause and effect becomes scrambled and it becomes impossible to 
tell which is the effect of the other.'36 Tamagotchi, as virtual pets, 
reveal to us the scrambling and complexity of the relation 
between reality and the virtual, turning nurture into a 
naturalised virtuality.
Following on from the contexts described above, perhaps one of 
the reasons Tamagotchi has become so popular is that it feeds 
directly on our sense of increasing inability to be able to determine 
and fully comprehend our effects. As subjects (who gain our very 
'subjectivity' through the reflection of ourselves in others and 
through the interpretation of texts 37), we seem to have developed 
the desire to make something respond to us and to which we 
have immediate and eventually dire effects.
By broadening the ethical model of consequence out from its close 
proximity to subjectivity to a more complex system of 
relationality, we are able to start to make connections outside of 
our immediate anthropocentric worlds. Revealing the material 
life-cycle of the Tamagotchi (as was demonstrated in Section Two) 
is one way of working against the complete hegemony of the 
narratives of 'life' as constructed in the image of 'virtual life'. No 
matter how immaterial, imaginative and ethereal virtual worlds 
such as Tamagotchi appear to be, they are still contained within 
the finitudinal boundary of human interpretative ability. A 'real' 
dog would not immediately interpret a Tamagotchi 'egg' as a 
rival. However, the dog may notice that this object is taking up 
human attention and changing behaviour. By using this example 
I am forced into an anthropomorphism which projects a certain
36 Jean Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images, translated by Paul Patton & Paul 
Foss (Power Publications, Sydney, 1987), p. 19.
57 Paul Ricoeur writes: 'what is interpreted in a text is the proposing of a world 
that I might inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost powers' and 
later: 'The shortest route from the self to itself is through the images of others.' 
Paul Ricoeur quoted in Kearney, 'Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutic Imagination', 
P-17.
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image of the 'other' in order to illustrate yet another human-
meaning.
By making pets 'virtual', is it possible that 'real' animals may be 
relieved from the burdens of human subjectivism? The abuse 
animals are subjected to through our attention (or lack of it) could 
be a way of lessening negative human impacts on the animal 
domain. But this consideration opens up a larger, more 
problematic question. If animals are no longer to serve as our 
pets, where will they go and how will they survive? Is there room 
in our vision of the future (a world projected which effects our 
current world) for animals beyond our use of them as 'standing 
reserve'? The increasingly enframed and designed worlds in 
which we live have less and less time and space for others to exist 
in their own autonomy. The enframing of our modern 
technologised lives Heidegger argues is capable only of revealing 
to us our own image.
Although animals are made to be our foils (especially pets), 
encountering them at least forces humans to recognise our own 
finitude and capacity to be open to the world of genuinely alterior 
'other'. To paraphrase Gadamer, in any genuine questioning 
(which this article has sought to be) there is a wall of negativity 
which is faced, and this is the knowledge of 'not knowing'.38 9 I 
would argue that Tamagotchi's 'otherness' gets concealed by their 
momentum and interpretation as sign. The caring-for relation 
which they seemingly encourage is actually packaged into a more 
generalised caring-about that does not have to confront the 
knowledge of 'not knowing'.
Because in an ecological/relational framework everything has 
effect, it is a moot point that something is indeed being effected by 
Tamagotchi's presence and use. Thus my concern over the ethical 
models being taught and learnt by an encounter with Tamagotchi 
is one of caring-for what is being effected by their use. What is 
taught is a generalised type of care that pays little heed to the 
complexity of responses needed for changing situations. What 
Tamagotchi (as consumer item) does is market and package 
’ethics’. I have argued that such a form of 'ethics' is actually
38 Martin Heidegger, 'A Question Concerning Technology' in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays (Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1977) 
pp. 26-27. This modem technological enframing (or Gestell) is only capable of 
revealing the world as 'standing reserve' to the human.
39 Gadamer quoted in Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 198.
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unethical because the consequence is that ethics can then be 
disposed of once the fad is over. In the mean-time our idea of 
what 'care', 'response' and ultimately 'ethics' are have been 
transformed, and it is a world which we all now inherit.
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Thinking like an ecosystem:
the ethics of the relocation, rehabilitation
and release of wildlife
Glenn Albrecht
Human intervention in the form of the rehabilitation, relocation and release of wildlife seems, on the face of it, to be a good thing. It is an outlet for human compassion 
for species other than our own and is generally aimed at 
restoration of an environmental imbalance that humans 
themselves have caused. Similarly, research in the scientific 
community whose goal to captive breed and then release rare and 
endangered species back into 'the wild' seems virtuous in that it is 
meeting an important conservation need. However, it shall be 
argued in this article that such actions are self-contradictory in 
that they permit the continuation of the very conditions that led 
to their being undertaken in the first instance. While limited 
ethical justification can be made for rehabilitation, relocation and 
release of wildlife, it is not strong when faced with the claims of 
what might be called 'ecological justice' where the highest good 
equals the protection of the maximum amount of interconnected 
biodiversity in a given environment. The achievement of this 
higher good requires that our ethical attention and limited 
scientific and financial resources move away from supporting 
individual animals and species and be urgently redirected to the 
preservation and management of whole ecosystems.
The Need to Rehabilitate
The intervention by humans in the natural world is at one level 
inevitable and must be accepted as no different in principle to the 
interventions undertaken by other species as they go about the 
tasks of survival and reproduction. Intervention in the existing 
order of things by species is a major cause of change in the natural 
world and a creator of biodiversity in ecosystems. It is at this level, 
in balance, a positive and creative force in the natural order. On 
another level, however, intervention becomes a destructive force 
where the level of disturbance goes beyond the ability of living 
things to tolerate change and adapt to the new. Suffering and 
extinction are the likely outcomes of such intervention
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/disturbance and the ecosystem in question moves furthers 
towards some kind of monoculture or monotony, like a field of 
wheat or a car park. Under such circumstances, catastrophe is 
possible since the system is susceptible to epidemics of change.
The issue of human intervention in the natural order of things in 
the form of the rehabilitation, relocation and release of wildlife 
covers the full spectrum of intervention. The rehabilitation of 
sick or injured animals and their successful release back into their 
own habitat appears to maintain the complexity and diversity of 
ecosystems. The relocation of species that have exceeded the 
carrying capacity of their home range also seems to be 
praiseworthy in that it reduces suffering and death of animals 
doomed to catastrophic overpopulation in environments that 
limit their growth. The same could be said for captive breeding 
programs that have as their goal, the release of rare and 
endangered species into 'the wild': it is better to have these 
programs than to see yet more of our native animals added to the 
'extinct' list.
The issue of rehabilitation and translocation intervention arises 
in a specific context in Australia. The assemblage of flora and 
fauna that was present in 1788 has been severely altered by 
colonisation of people from all over the world. The old 
Churchillian wartime phrase has been twisted to capture the 
essence of 210 years of colonisation: 'never in the history o f  
human kind have so few done so much damage in so little time.1
This is not the context to provide a detailed catalogue of the loss 
of species and the contraction of ecosystems, however, it is 
important to be reminded just how severe the damage to 
Australia's biodiversity has been. Australia is now infamous 
worldwide for the scale of environmental change, species 
extinction (especially mammals) and species now rare and 
endangered. 1





Fish - 10 8 18
Amphibians - 12 2 14
Reptiles - 13 41 54
Birds 21 32 50 103
Mammals 20 33 16 69
Total 41 100 117 258
Table 1. (Based on the Commonwealth State of the Environment Report, 1996)2
And, to reinforce the severity of this problem, the following 
comment from this Report indicates that things are not getting 
any better:
The bad news...
The loss of biological diversity is perhaps our most 
serious environmental problem. Whether we look at 
wetlands or saltmarshes, mangroves or bushland, 
inland creeks or estuaries, the same story emerges. In 
many cases, the destruction of habitat, the major cause 
of biodiversity loss, is continuing at an alarming rate.
The need to halt and ideally reverse this situation is clear and 
intervention in the form of rehabilitation, relocation and release 
of native animals is just one part of a bigger rehabilitation picture 
for the total environment of Australia.
The Evaluation of Rehabilitation and Release 
Programs
The possibility of evaluating the options of rehabilitation, 
relocation and release depends largely on there being some 
evaluative standard measuring 'success' that all can agree on and 
the ability of science or some other institution to supply reliable 
data on whether the standard is being met. Conservation 
biologists have developed a set of practical criteria based on such 
factors as acclimatisation, medical and genetic screening, pre- and 
post-release training, provisioning and monitoring3 as a measure 2
2 Commonwealth of Australia, State of the Environment Report, 1996,
http://www.erin.gov.aU/portfolio/dest/soe/soe96/soeexec2.htm#overviewofth
eenvironment.
see B.B. Beck et al, 'Reintroduction of Captive-bom Animals' in P.J.S. Olney et 
al, eds., Creative Conservation: interactive management of wild and captive 
animals (Chapman Hall, London, 1994), p.273.
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of the success or failure of reintroduction projects for captive bred 
populations. The Beck team's measure for success of a 
reintroduction program was that 'The wild population 
subsequently reached at least 500 individuals, which are free of 
provisioning or other human support (and)...will be self- 
sustaining.'3 4
These criteria do not, however, address cultural and ethical 
questions about whether such projects ought to be undertaken in 
the first place. Cultural values are notoriously difficult to 
evaluate. In the domain of the cultural significance of animals it 
is evident that considerable disagreement prevails between those 
who value animals solely for their instrumental value (circuses, 
fox hunters) and those who value then for aesthetic (wildlife 
photographers) and 'spiritual' (indigenous Australians) reasons.
It is possible to develop evaluative frameworks for assessing 
relocation and release programs by undertaking a systematic 
examination of the models and theories of environmental value 
offered by contemporary environmental philosophers. However, 
such an exercise is likely to be of interest mainly to 
environmental philosophers and given the huge diversity of 
views on offer in environmental ethics, it is, in any case, a task 
beyond the capacity of a short article.5
I offer two related ways of avoiding this dilemma. The first is to 
propose a simplified schema for the evaluation of intervention 
based on some fairly uncontroversial knowledge that we have 
about the importance of biodiversity and its reliance on ecosystem 
preservation. The second is to generate an ethical framework by 
close examination of the outcomes of such actions on both the 
humans and animals involved in rehabilitation and release 
programs. If it can be shown that the commitments and actions of 
carers, researchers and policy makers are inconsistent with the 
interests of individual animals and species involved, then such 
commitments and actions are also self-contradictory for the 
person /group involved. This is the case if animals continue to 
suffer because of our interventions and if ongoing loss of habitat
4 Ibid., p.273.
3 See M. Zimmerman, Contesting the Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and
Postmodernity (University of California Press, Berkeley,1994) for a systematic
account of such theories.
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compromises the likely success of release and relocation 
programs.
Ecosystems and Values
Biologists worldwide agree that the major contemporary factor 
driving species to extinction is anthropogenic habitat destruction.6 
It takes no breath-taking logic to conclude from this that if we 
desire to see this trend stopped, then habitat protection in the 
form of ecosystem protection is needed. Value is then placed on 
total biodiversity and protection of ecosystems and habitat that 
contain it becomes the goal of human endeavor.
Such a perspective on total biodiversity has been offered by 
ecologists such as Aldo Leopold.7 Leopold, in a now famous 
example, argued that the mountains of North America live "in 
fear' of their deer, just as deer live in fear of wolves. Remove the 
wolf and deer proliferate with subsequent overbrowsing of the 
vegetation of the mountain. Loss of vegetation, in turn, causes 
erosion and loss of the substance of the mountain. To think 
ecologically, we need to 'think like a mountain' and appreciate the 
full balance between predator, prey and habitat. This shift in 
thinking requires movement from attempting to value nature by 
assessing individual units, to valuing based on cumulative 
diversity and complexity.8
In Australia, similar balances are critical for a diverse and rich 
environment. It could be said that arid Australia lives in fear of 
overgrazing from kangaroos, just as kangaroos live in fear of 
predation from Dingoes or 10,000 years ago, Thylacines. In other 
words, animals at the top of the food chain play a vital role in 
preventing gross exploitation of finite resources from those lower 
down in a food chain. The same could be said for parasites whose 
role is to trim the population of excess by attacking those who are 
in some way weak; their role is no less important than other 
more charismatic species. In complex adaptive systems, it is not
6 See Andrew P. Dobson, Conservation and Biodiversity (Scientific American
Library, New York, 1996) for a very useful summary of the contemporary issues. 
See Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1966); in particular, the essay, 'Thinking Like a Mountain'.
See Bryan Norton, 'On the Inherent Danger of Undervaluing Species' in B. 
Norton, ed., The Preservation of Species: The Value of Biodiversity (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1986) on the importance of valuing total diversity.
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possible to isolate elements that are clearly more important than 
others.
Given the complexity of ecosystems it is not desirable or practical 
to assess the value of species or human actions in ways that are 
isolated from the system as a whole. Such a perspective is 
consistent with what we currently know about individuals, 
species and their relationship to their habitat. Animals exist by 
virtue of their dependence on a functioning ecosystem within 
which they survive and their survival is partly constitutive of 
that ecosystem at the same time. Species and habitat co-evolv e  
and do so over millions of years. It is then impossible to 
disaggregate such interdependence and put values on so-called 
parts of what is an organically unified whole. It makes good 
ecological sense to value the whole, as it is the whole that 
ultimately supports life, including our own.
A movement from atomistic to holistic values is difficult to 
contemplate since most value in contemporary society is assessed 
in terms of individual items or units for human consumption. 
Current ways of valuing animals are also solidly 'atomistic' and 
apply as much to killing them for food as wanting them for 
display and amusement in circuses and zoos.9 The new view, by 
contrast, will require a re-evaluation of all forms of intervention 
in natural systems and will enable a critical appraisal of the 
different types of rehabilitation and release undertaken by 
individuals and organisations. From the ethical perspective of 
ecological justice, the interconnected whole is the one that needs 
more attention focussed on it and such a focus might mean that 
efforts to intervene at the level of individual animals or even 
individual species might be considered to be noble but misguided. 
Rather, resources that are scarce and valuable (including the 
resource of the community of research scientists and the 
rehabilitation community) should be redirected to the main 
problem confronting wildlife in Australia, fragmentation and 
complete loss of habitat.
9 The Animal Liberation Movement, when based on the ideas of Peter Singer, is also 
committed to the evaluation of atomistic emits of ethical concern, the sentience 
possessed by individual animals and species. In addition, questions about the use of 
species without sentience are not within the realm of such ethics. Species without 
central nervous systems, all plants and whole ecosystems, do not then come under 
ethical consideration within this tradition. It is for this reason that those with a 
more ecologically orientated ethic clash with those whose focus is solely on 
individual animals or species.
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The Rehabilitation, Relocation and Release of 
Individual Animals
At one level of analysis, an ethic of compassion, care and concern, 
which is at the core of human involvement with animals in need 
of rehabilitation and or relocation, is an expression of the very 
best of human virtues. Individuals who selflessly devote time 
and their own limited finances to animals in need are indeed 
followers of St Francis of Assisi. Such selflessness is even more 
apparent when native wildlife-carers risk their own health in the 
support some species. Those that care for Fruit Bats, for example, 
run the risk of the potentially fatal lyssavirus and morbillivirus if 
bitten by their patients. So at the level of an individual human, 
we would want to support animal carers as humane and virtuous 
individuals. From the perspective of the animals that benefit 
from such care, the opportunity to 'have a life' where one was 
previously unlikely must be seen as something positive. Where 
such animals can be returned to their previous habitat, then it 
seems that complexity and diversity are maintained.
However, it is almost invariably the case that the primary cause 
for the need for an animal to be rehabilitated is a major 
perturbation to the habitat of that creature by humans. The case of 
Koalas in Eastern Australia is instructive. Koala habitat is 
contracting because of a large number of human development 
pressures. Urbanisation, logging and woodchipping, road 
construction, increasing numbers of cars and domestic dogs are 
but some of the factors that cause injury to Koalas. Koala carers 
and vets, in conjunction with such institutions as the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), the 
Australian Koala Foundation and the Native Animals Trust 
Fund, do their best to rehabilitate injured and sick Koalas and 
return them to the wild.
It is apparent, however, that the very same pressures that lead to 
the need for rehabilitation in the first place have not been 
removed from the Koalas' habitat, indeed, they have most likely 
been magnified. All too often, animals are released, only to be 
found dead or in need of further help within a very short period 
of time. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the animal 
has become habituated to humans and their environment and is 
thus more likely to place itself in a risky situation (for example,
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close to dogs) in the future. The ethics of this situation become 
less clear. A well-intentioned and virtuous act inadvertently 
causes continued suffering on the part of native animals. In 
addition, the human resources put into the rehabilitation of 
individual animals are considerable with time and large amounts 
of money at stake. The veterinary expenses alone create pressure 
for more funding to cover costs. The tough questions must be 
asked in this situation, 'have scarce human and economic 
resources been used optimally?' Have the medium to long term 
animal welfare aspects of the situation been carefully assessed?
A possible solution to this dilemma is to place rehabilitated 
animals back into 'safe' areas but increasingly for animals such as 
Koalas, such safe places are likely to be fragments of urban 
bushland that have a very finite capacity to hold a viable 
population. Supplementary feeding is necessary to hold a number 
of animals that exceeds the carrying capacity of the remnant patch. 
Overcrowding may in turn lead to social and health problems 
within the captive population as normal spaces between and 
within the generations and sexes become constricted. Such areas 
also create an access problem because 'safe' means free from 
predators and this means investment into dog-proof fences. The 
Koala 'environment' becomes indistinguishable from a zoo 
where captive animals are held. Temptations are then strong to 
use the captive population as an ecotourism-education venture 
that has as its justification: the generation of funds to cover the 
costs of the rehabilitation of injured Koalas. What started as the 
ethical impulse of 'care' ends up enmeshed in the grey area of 
ecocapitalism and the imperatives of profit making. It was these 
same motives that led to Koala habitat destruction by other types 
of entrepreneurial activity in the first place.
Without expanses of habitat large enough for rehabilitated species 
to be safely released, the ethical impulse to care for animals is 
inexorably shifted from something unambiguously ethically good 
to something that has potentially undesirable consequences. I 
argue that such an outcome is the inevitable result of a focus on 
individual animals to the exclusion of ecosystems and the habitat 
requirements of the whole species. Where emotion overrides 
ecology, the result is likely to be negative for the species, and, in 
the medium to long term, negative for individual carers as their 
intensive efforts become increasingly failure prone. It is clearly 
contradictory to engage in emergency action that will inevitably
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lead to an even greater need for more of the same action in the 
future. Intervention somewhere 'upstream' of the problem is 
urgently needed to break out of this contradiction.
Native animals live in fear of cars and dogs, but they also live in 
fear of those who rehabilitate and release them back into 
dangerous urban jungles.
Rehabilitation, Relocation and Release of Whole 
Species
The issues discussed above become even more pressing when the 
scope of reintroduction moves from individual animals to 
populations of whole species. In Australia, species based 
reintroductions and relocations have met with limited success, 
something that mirrors the international experience. In a study of 
145 reintroductions of captive-bred populations worldwide, Beck 
et al concluded that under their criteria for success (see above), 
only 11% of reintroduction projects could be considered 
successful. Lack of reliable data hampered further and more 
detailed analysis and their study concluded:
In two years of intense searching we were able to 
acquire reasonably complete information on less than 
50% of projects known to have reintroduced captive- 
bom animals. Written information documenting 
reintroduction procedures and post-release outcomes 
for over 13 million individual animals fills less than 
one file draw.10 *
In Australia, case studies such as those on the Brush-tailed 
Phascogale11 and the Marla12 indicate that reintroduction is a very 
complicated affair with failure to implement appropriate fire 
management and heavy predation from mainly introduced 
ground predators the reasons for limited success. Other research,
10 Beck et al, 'Reintroduction of Captive-bom Animals', p.281.
See T.R. Soderquist & M. Serena, 'An experimental reintroduction programme 
for brush-tailed phascogales (phascogale tapoatafa): the interface between 
captivity and the wild'in Olney, Creative Conservation.
The Marla project has 'played a major role in alerting Australian 
conservationists to the importance of fire management and feral predators in the 
recovery of critical weight range desert mammals. It has also been responsible for 
preventing the last mainland representation of the species from becoming 
extinct.'
(http: //www .biodiversity .environment.gov.au/plants/threaten/brconf/brinkab 
s.htm#male)
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based on recent translocation experiments with both hand reared 
and wild possums in Victoria13 indicate that such animals are 
highly stressed by translocation and have a very high and rapid 
mortality rate. Such high mortality is thought to be connected to 
the aggression of resident possums and the inability of 'naive' 
animals to safely navigate in an 'alien' forest environment.
Behavioural conditioning for predator identification and 
avoidance and the intensive acquisition of new environment 
skills might be ways of reducing the high rate of suffering and 
mortality in relocated animals. However, in addition to other 
costs, intensive training for predator avoidance and learning wild 
habitat 'life skills' makes the economics of such programs 
questionable. The need for intensive conditioning makes the very 
idea of re-introducing 'wild' animals into 'natural' habitat 
somewhat farcical.
In order to increase survival rates for relocations, active predator 
removal may also be required. However, this conventionally 
involves practices such as trapping, shooting and poisoning that 
have ethical implications of their own. It is now commonplace 
for the ethically motivated attempt to introduce or relocate 
animals to clash with the equally ethically motivated move to 
prevent cruelty and suffering to animals.
The case study of the Phascogales in Victoria indicate that without 
data on the ecology and behaviour of the species, the success of 
captive breeding and reintroduction programs is very limited. 
Soderquist and Serena indicated that '[u]nfortunately, the amount 
of time, effort and resources required to generate detailed 
ecological information about rare species of fauna is usually 
considerable'.14 It is self-evident that such information needs to be 
primarily generated 'in the field' by researchers who are prepared 
to get out of laboratories and study animals in their home 
habitat.15
13As reported by Peter R. Brown, in his paper, 'Current Scientific Research on the 
Rehabilitation and Translocation of Australian Wildlife' at the 1998 RSPCA 
Australia Scientific Seminar.
14 Soderquist & Serena, 'An experimental reintroduction programme for brush-
tailed phascogales', pp.437-8.
15 This is not to say that all lab-based work should cease. Identifying genetically 
distinct sub-species is critical for strategic re-introductions and this can only be 
done with lab-based work.
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Overall, despite the best efforts and good will of those involved, 
the track record of relocation and re-introduction programs has 
been very poor. If anything, animals in these programs seem to 
experience higher degrees of suffering 'in the wild' than what they 
would experience if they were culled or placed in 'safe' 
environments such as zoos. At the very least, those concerned 
with animal welfare must seriously question the rationality of 
throwing energy and resources at a problem that is not being 
helped by their actions. As habitat continues to contract, the 
likelihood of failure in rehabilitation and relocation will continue 
to increase.
A Case Study: The Koala in Eastern Australia
One species with a long history of intervention and relocation is 
the Koala in eastern Australia. Historical evidence suggests that 
the species was rare or absent from the open forests and 
woodlands of the west and coastal areas of Victoria in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. From this time onwards, the Koala has 
been involved in a roller coaster ride in terms of its population 
and the health of the species. It seems that the degree of direct 
human intervention is the most crucial determinant of Koala 
numbers in any one point in time.
In pre-European times, the Aboriginal people would have kept 
Koala numbers in check since they ate Koala flesh and may have 
used their pelts for furs.16 The Aboriginal relationship with the 
Dingo may have also helped keep Koala numbers in check since 
Dingos are known Koala predators. The burning of forest to keep 
it open and free from wildfire may also have restricted Koala 
habitat and hence potential expansion of the population.
The extermination and relocation of the Aboriginal people by 
European diseases, frontier war and colonisation removed a 
major predator and consumer of the Koala and allowed a new 
ecological succession to emerge. Furthermore, as colonists 
poisoned Dingoes and changed fire regimes, the Koala was given 
even greater habitat to invade. As observed by Parris in the lower 
Gouldburn River district:
16 Photographs exist of Victorian Aborigines (cl877) dressed in full-length 
possum-skin coats sewn by bone needles. See T. Flannery, The Future Eaters 
(Reed, Sydney, 1994).
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Koalas were unknown in the district when it was first 
settled in 1839, but a few were present in Red Gums 
along the river in the 1850s. By the 1860s Koalas were 
abundant and in the following decades were described as 
being "in thousands".17
However, later in the century as the fur industry expanded, 
human predation on Koalas again became a major factor in their 
range and numbers. The international demand for fur was such 
that in 1924 'over two million (pelts) were exported from the 
eastern states'.18 By the 1920s, the whole species was depleted to 
such low numbers (500 individuals) that many feared that it 
would become extinct in Victoria as it had done in South 
Australia.
In order to save the species in Victoria, animals were relocated to 
offshore islands where they generally thrived. Without any 
immediate natural restrictions to expanding their numbers, these 
island populations rapidly expanded leading to overbrowsing of 
the vegetation with consequent death, disease and starvation in 
the Koalas. As related by Menkhorst:
In 1944, following a public outcry, the remaining 1314 
Koalas were taken from Quail Island to alleviate serious 
overbrowsing which had resulted in many deaths and 
1367 were also removed from Phillip Island.19
The translocated animals were placed in release sites on the 
mainland and it is now the case that the species covers most of its 
former range and in numbers that put it into the 'non-threatened' 
category in Victoria. In a note of warning, however, Menkhorst 
suggests that 'a level of population control in Chlamydia-free 
populations may be necessary as unoccupied sites for release 
become fewer'.20
More specific Koala relocation studies indicate that populations 
can thrive in new environments. As argued by George Wilson:
17 Parris cited in P.W.Menkhorst, ed. Mammals of Victoria: Disbribution, Ecology 
and Conservation (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995), p.86.
18 W. Lines, Taming the Great South Land (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1991), 
p.171.
19 Menkhorst, Mammals of Victoria, p.86.
20 Ibid., p.88. It must also be noted that the Phillip Island population was a 
source of the bacterial disease Chlamydia, which is now widespread throughout 
eastern Australia. Translocation of individuals from that population was 
stopped in the late 1970s.
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From 1972 to 1974, 19 koalas were introduced at the 
Narrandera Nature Reserve on the Murrumbidgee 
River...Ten came from French Island and the others 
from the north coast of NSW. They appear to have 
adapted well to the diet of Eucalyptus cam eldulensis - 
River red gum. An annual count is performed on the 
population during which more than 30 animals are 
counted. They are distributed on the Nature Reserve 
and the adjacent common. The total population is 
estimated at over 100 koalas.21
Such a success has prompted Wilson to suggest that the solution 
to Kangaroo Island's overpopulation of Koalas is to relocate them 
to areas along the Murray, the Murrumbidgee, and the Lachlan 
Rivers where there exist 'many thousands of hectares of suitable 
habitat without koalas'. It is argued that this option is preferable to 
culling the excess population (thought to be about 2000 animals) 
or relocating sterilised animals to the south east of the state of 
South Australia. As it has transpired, the government of South 
Australia has proceeded with a Koala rescue program that has 
avoided the culling of the excess animals on the grounds that the 
mass killing of a national icon would be unacceptable to many 
Australians. In order to control numbers, surgical sterilisation of 
over 2000 Koalas has been undertaken and up to 800 sterilised 
individuals will be relocated from Kangaroo Island to the 
mainland. The cost of this program is in the vicinity of $635,000.22
Such a case study highlights all of the ethical and ecological 
dilemmas outlined above. These range from public outcry over 
the suffering of starving animals, equal outcry over the possible 
culling of excess animals and the suffering this would impose, the 
intervention of surgery on individual animals and the distress 
this would cause, the expense of relocation, culling and surgery 
and the ecological implications of relocation to Koala-free habitat. 
As is almost always the case with complex adaptive systems, 
nothing is simple.
A key problem with the Wilson proposal is that the likely impacts 
of a new species on a habitat that is already under pressure from 
clearing, firewood, salinisation and disease are not predictable.
http ://w w w .awt.com.au/koala/Historyform.html
See Drew Laslett, 'Is relocation the Solution to Overpopulation-A case Study of 
Koalas of the Kangaroo Island', paper at the 1988 RSPCA Australia Scientific 
Seminar.
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While the relocated Koalas may thrive for some time, they could 
destroy the environment into which they are introduced. 
Although not an island in the true sense, the forest they are to be 
relocated to has boundaries that are shrinking under the pressures 
of agriculture and forestry. As the evidence from the Victorian 
experience would suggest, the Koalas would expand their 
population beyond the carrying capacity of what is effectively an 
'island' of remnant River Red Gum. The whole relocation 
exercise then becomes self-defeating since once again there will be 
a public outcry over starving Koalas, the proposed methods of 
culling and the expense. The only difference this time is that there 
will be no Koala-free forest left for the starving Koalas to go. 
Again, we are faced with a clear contradiction between a good 
intention and an undesirable possible outcome.
The problem with the Koala Rescue Program is that while it may 
save public face, the resources it is consuming could more wisely 
be put into preservation of habitat and the conservation of species 
that are more threatened than Koalas. By not culling in the 
conventional way (shooting performed by experts) the scarce and 
valuable resources available for conservation get channeled in 
one major direction and set a precedent for future rescue actions. 
A 'charismatic' ethics then operates with only the cutest animals 
being singled out for our help and resources. The commercial 
temptation to 'recoup' some of the costs of such 'hands on' 
intervention by exporting 'excess' Koalas is great, with 
accountants not too sensitive to the ethics of keeping wild 
animals in captivity and politicians keen to be seen with cute and 
media attractive animals on a world stage. Koala politics and 
marsupial economics can deliver highly unethical outcomes for 
biodiversity in general, and Koalas in particular.
The Koala once lived in fear of Aborigines and Dingoes and 
because of this they were not involved in the overbrowsing of 
eucalypts. Well-intentioned relocation of Koalas has created a 
eucalypt forest that now lives in fear of its Koalas. Perhaps both 
Koalas and eucalypts live in fear of humans who have emotional, 
ethical and economic motives that fail to understand the biology 
of the species concerned and the complex ecological systems 
within which they exist.
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Knowledge of Australian Marsupials
Having already highlighted the urgent need for basic biological, 
behavioural and ecological knowledge about our native animals, 
it is instructive to examine the current trends and priorities in 
mammalian research in Australia. Very few attempts have been 
made to systematically evaluate the type of work being 
undertaken and the mix of resources going into the conservation 
of indigenous fauna. Johnson has produced one such effort with 
respect to the conservation of the family of rock-wallabies. He 
examined the 50 scientific papers published on rock-wallabies 
from 1985-1994 and found that 34% focussed on genetics, 24% on 
biology, 16% on parasitology, 14% on survey and the least 
numerous were on conservation at 6%.23 In addition he found 
that there is very little cooperation between management agencies 
and the research institutions such as universities and The 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.24 
Johnson argues that in a period of diminishing resources, better 
networks between research and management could generate 
benefits for both the humans involved, and, importantly, the 
rock-wallabies themselves. It is likely that similar findings and 
conclusions could be made on virtually all other mammal species 
in Australia.
The pressures on those working in the major research 
institutions in Australia on the basic biology of species are now 
firmly in the direction of economic outcomes of research. No less 
a figure than Hugh Tyndale-Biscoe, the 'father' of marsupial 
research in Australia, has lamented the fact that it has taken a 
long time for the study of marsupials to become 'respectable 
research material' and that just at this historical point, economic 
rationalism is having a detrimental effect on its progress. 
Tyndale-Biscoe argues:
With the rise of economic rationalism another 
insidious notion has come to predominate: that if 
research cannot promise an immediate return on 
investment it should not be funded. This malign view 
of research funding is having a particularly serious
K.A. Johnson, 'Improving Conservation Outcomes: The Partnership between 
Research and Management', Australian Mammalogy, 19, (1997), pp.315-317.
Johnson suggests that the 'apparent segregation of research and 
management...is...probably an artifact of an evolving science rather than any 
designed segregation' in 'Improving Conservation Outcomes, p.317.
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effect on the health of research into marsupials. The pity 
is that this is happening at just the time when research 
on several aspects of marsupial biology is coming to 
fruition.23 *5
In spite of this pronouncement, Tyndale-Biscoe also catalogues a 
number of developments in marsupial research that have 
important or potentially important economic benefits. Among 
them is research on the way marsupials can have rapid 
reproductive rates when environmental conditions are 
favourable. Specifically, research is directed at marsupial gamete 
storage and fertilised eggs and the potential to use this 
information to enhance breeding in domestic species such as 
cattle. Another possible economic use of marsupials is as a 
'protein biofactory' where genetically manipulated (transgenic) 
cows could produce lactose-free milk based on the encoding of 
enzymes for such milk produced in marsupial mammary glands. 
Current research on immunocontraception is directed towards 
the control of feral possum populations in New Zealand. W hile 
control of the possum population has conservation objectives, it 
is clear that control of bovine tuberculosis is a major priority of 
the research.26 It seems that the overwhelming interest in the 
genetic and reproductive systems of marsupials is being driven by 
economic motives.
Pre-eminent among such research is the Cooperative Research 
Center for Conservation and Management of Marsupials 
(CRCCMM). The CRCCMM has a key role in the contemporary 
study and conservation of Australian marsupials. Its total funding 
from the New Zealand and Australian governments from 
establishment in 1995 is 35.5 million dollars and its main 
objectives are outlined in the following statement:
Australia faces special conservation and management 
problems because of its unique marsupials. A research 
program that integrates fundamental and applied 
research is vital to the development of appropriate 
techniques for the management of captive and wild
23 H. Tyndale-Biscoe, 'Prologue' in N. Saunders & L. Hinds, Marsupial Biology:
Recent Research, New Perspectives (University of New South Wales Press,
Sydney, 1997)), p.2.
26 In New Zealand in 1993/4 NZ $7 million was spent on possum control to protect 




populations. New Zealand shares our interest in 
marsupials because Australian marsupials were actively 
introduced and have become major pests. There are 
strongly linked research subprograms. The programs are 
gaining an understanding of fundamental aspects of 
marsupial reproduction and genetics strategic to the 
development of practical conservation and 
management tools and policies.These include gamete 
maturation and fertilisation and their endocrine 
regulation; genetic characterisation of reference species; 
applied research to develop such practical skills as: 
hormone-based manipulation of reproductive activity, 
semen collection, assessment, storage and artificial 
insemination; knowledge of processes threatening rare 
or endangered marsupials.27
As an important component of these overall aims, the CRCs keep 
captive bred and wild sourced populations of Australian native 
animals. These are used in research to gain basic biological 
information about species. Both the intrinsic value of such 
information and the applied aspects of controlling population 
numbers and assisting rare and endangered animals to be 
reintroduced into the wild are offered as reasons why such 
populations are kept. Although detailed statistics are not 
available, many hundreds if not thousands of native animals are 
kept in captivity. Many are sacrificed each year by both CRC and 
Australian Research Council funded research on native animals 
which have population control or reintroduction of captive bred 
populations into the wild as one of their main rationales.
The problem with such research is that it is neither dispassionate 
nor disinterested. Because control of pests is an economic issue of 
considerable importance to New Zealand and pastoralists in 
Australia, it could be argued that valuable resources are going into 
researching a problem that has economic but not crucial ecological 
importance to the biodiversity of Australia. The biological control 
of pests has its own array of ethical problems linked to invasive 
experimentation on animals and risk imposition on non-target 
native species.28 Having captive bred populations of native 
animals that will never have habitat that they can be reintroduced
2g http:/ /  www.dist.gov.au/crc/compend/environ/crccmm.html
t is noteworthy that the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
rganisation identify only concerns about the potential impact of viral control of 
contraception of feral animals such as foxes, in counties where they remain as 
native animals.
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into involves misleading the public about the motivation for the 
research and is an ongoing excuse for vivisection and the keeping 
of native animals in zoo-like conditions.29 Under these 
circumstances, populations of Australian native animals 
currently being kept in Australian universities are the antipodean 
equivalents of Guinea Pigs. They exist only as laboratory animals 
to serve the interests of governments, science and the current 
dominant economic imperatives. Given the precarious state of 
many of the wild marsupials in Australia, this emphasis on the 
economic potential of our animals at the expense of their 
ecological viability is not defensible.
The scientists of Australia might be living in fear of their own 
funding sources but the marsupials of Australia just might be 
living in fear of research scientists and the politicians that 
manipulate them.
The organisation most responsible for research on biodiversity 
and the ecosystems within which it lives in Australia is the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO). According to CSIRO:
Current conservation reserves comprise just over 5 per 
cent of Australia, but do not provide an adequate 
representation of our biological diversity. This is 
primarily because reserves are concentrated in areas left 
after land has been selected for agriculture, forestry or 
urban development. Even if we could afford to 
represent all of our biological diversity within reserves, 
some threats - fires, weeds and feral animals - are 
difficult to exclude, so that 'protected areas' are not really 
secure. Thus, the network of conservation reserves is 
important but it will never be sufficient for the 
conservation of Australia's biological diversity.30
The meek acceptance of such a situation and the easy dismissal of 
the potential of a greatly expanded reserve network and the 
greater resources needed to manage such reserves is an indication 
that CSIRO is also having its policy directions strongly influenced 
by economic, not ecological considerations. With only 4.6 percent
29 The Fat-Tailed Dunnart is now being used as a laboratory species for basic 
research into metabolism, anatomy and physiology. It is secure in captive 
populations but is still under threat in the wild.
30 www.dwe.csiro.au/publications/laolprob.htm
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of its 1997-8 budget allocated to biodiversity as compared with 33% 
for agribusiness and 18% for minerals and energy, it is not 
difficult to see where the research priorities of CSIRO lie.
Current government policy is exacerbating this problem in that it 
is forcing organisations like CSIRO and The Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics to seek larger amounts of 
external funding. CSIRO will have 35% of its total income from 
external sources in 1998-2000. In addition, 'outsourcing7 as an 
expression of the privatisation policy of the current government 
is reflected in the CSIRO claim that private landholders and 
developers will have to become effective environmental 
managers since effective management cannot be done within the 
existing public funding and reserve allocations. If there is already 
a lack of coordination between organisations like CSIRO, other 
research institutions and fauna management agencies, then the 
problems of coordinating thousands of individual private 
landholders to effectively protect biodiversity seem 
insurmountable. Again, the big losers will be native species and 
their habitat requirements.
Private Enterprise and the Reintroduction of 
Biodiversity
Given the declining investment in Australia's biodiversity by 
government and its partly tax-payer funded agencies, it is 
instructive to see if the private sector on its own is doing any 
better in the species and habitat conservation stakes. According to 
the publically listed company, Earth Sanctuaries, they are doing 
very well. Their own literature proudly proclaims:
Earth Sanctuaries has successfully reintroduced more 
species of rare and endangered wildlife, back into the 
wild, than all the National Parks, Wildlife Services and 
Zoos of Australia combined. While doing this it has also 
paid over 40% per annum return to its shareholders 
thus proving that conservation and profits can support 
each other. However, probably the most rewarding 
aspect is that, unlike government departments and 
non-profit organisations that can only care for the 
"grand" and the "cuddly", Earth Sanctuaries cares for 
the total bio-diversity. Earth Sanctuaries is the private 
sector alternative to the National Parks System.31
http: www .esl.com. au /  wlif e .htm
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Earth Sanctuaries has attempted to put a commercial value on its 
fauna and translated that value into shares that can be purchased 
and traded on the stock exchange. As the stock market goes 
through its cycles of boom and bust, presumably, the value of the 
fauna owned by Earth Sanctuaries goes up and down. In the event 
of a stock market crash and the need to 'liquidate assets', one 
wonders what will happen to the 'natural capital' living in the 
reserves. The temptation to liquidate assets is great, with the 
value of say, Platypus, for overseas zoos and collections very high. 
The trade and sale of native fauna for large sums of money severs 
the connection to the conservation of 'total biodiversity' and the 
preservation of habitat and moves the organisation responsible 
into realm of bio-capitalism.
Ecological problems with populations trapped within islands 
have been noted above and these apply as much to Earth 
Sanctuaries as any other enclosed habitat. If rare and endangered 
species are concentrated within such 'islands', then the prospect of 
disease wiping out the whole population is very real. Indeed, 
something along these lines seems to have occurred in 1997 when 
the Rabbit Calicivirus Disease (RCD) was accidentally released by 
CSIRO in what amounted to a very poor experimental protocol 
on Wardang Island. John Walmsley, the director of Earth 
Sanctuaries has argued that RCD was responsible for killing 100 
Burrowing Bettongs at Yookamurra sanctuary in the Murray 
Valley at the time of its 'release' in 1996-7.32
Even if it is shown that RCD was not the agent, it is clear that 
some sort of epidemic was responsible for the deaths and that a 
considerable part of the 'natural capital' of Yookamurra had just 
been wiped from the 'bottom line'. Relying on private enterprise 
to hold captive significant numbers of rare and endangered 
species in small pockets of habitat is, in the medium to long term, 
a risky strategy. The vicissitudes of the market are bad enough, but 
pretending to be an island sanctuary in a sea of impacting threats 
such as fire, disease, accidents and vandalism is not in the long 
term interests of either endangered species or habitat. It could be 
also argued that predators such as Dingos and Quolls33 are a vital
32 The West Australian, Sat., February 7, 1988, p.45.
33 Flannery notes that the native camivarous marsupial, the Quoll, killed about 
half the population of Brush-Tailed Bettongs that survived a bush fire in the 
south west of Western Australia. Foxes consumed the others. The Future Eaters 
p.239.
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component of a fully bio-diverse ecosystem and should therefore 
be an integral part of sanctuaries. However, having carnivores eat 
the 'grand and cuddly' in front of the cameras of the 'ecotourists' 
might not be supported by shareholders.
Australian animals live in fear of introduced predators, they also 
live in fear of entrepreneurs who build fences instead of 
condominiums.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that all strategies for intervention based on 
atomistic units of value are destined to fail to protect Australia's 
remaining biodiversity. Such atomistic units can be considered to 
be individual humans and their emotional need to care for sick 
and injured animals, individual animals, individual populations 
and species, a research community that has narrow economic 
outcomes and governments and private bodies that focus on 
individual parks.
While each of these domains has some justification in its own 
right, the ongoing loss of biodiversity and its habitat in Australia 
means that something continues to be fundamentally wrong. An 
individualistic ethic is appropriate at the level of an individual 
animal but becomes less so as we consider the forces which cause 
animals to need our care. Concern about the fate of starving 
populations of trapped animals is an appropriate and humane 
response until the longer term ecological damage done by 
relocation is taken into account. Research that gives us the 
technology and knowledge to captive breed, then reintroduces 
wildlife, is justifiable until it is evident that there is no habitat 
into which the animals can be reintroduced. Private providers of 
'fauna parks' look superficially plausible but offer a very risky 
future, especially for rare and endangered species. Public reserves 
and parks, because they are non-representative of all ecosystems 
and habitat, their patchiness and small size, are currently 
inadequate to maintain biodiversity.
What is evident is that there is a lack of coordination between 
these different interests and others such as zoos and governments 
that have a stake in the future of biodiversity in Australia. What 
can unite such diverse interests is an ecologically derived ethic 
that integrates each type of concern and places it into the broader
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biodiversity context. The need for transcontinental and 
transectoral institutions that have the task of coordinating the 
different components of the whole has never been greater. Such 
coordination bodies could then:
* lobby on behalf of Australia's biodiversity to get a fairer 
share of public resources from governments
* redirect fundamental fauna research from laboratory- 
based research with economic imperatives into field- 
based research on the ecosystem requirements of species
* help train a new generation of field-based fauna 
researchers
* recommend minimum reserves needed to maintain 
maximum biodiversity
* redirect the energy of individual carers into projects that 
are tied to viable habitat requirements for the species 
concerned
* evaluate the likely success of relocation programs in the 
light of ecological history and new knowledge
* expand the known success of low risk predator control 
programs
* incorporate indigenous knowledge into management 
strategies that maximise biodiversity
* develop education strategies that highlight the 
importance of biodiversity to Australians
It may be the case that these policy outcomes would involve quite 
radical departures from what was previously accepted as the 
norm. For example, with the knowledge we now have on the role 
of indigenous Australians in shaping and maintaining the 
biodiversity that was here in 1788, there is a niche available for 
those concerned with animal welfare to play a more active role on 
the management of total ecosystem welfare. The new ecological 
approach to management might challenge the deeply held views 
of some that under no circumstances is it permissible to 
humanely cull wild animal populations. It might go even further 
and present a challenge to those who believe that we should not 
utilise, for example, the furs of such culled animals for practical 
purposes. At the very least, it should encourage those who care
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about native animals to act so as to care and protect their habitat. 
This might entail a shift from wanting to hug Koalas to a desire to 
hug trees; a shift from individualistic ethics to ecological ethics.
Aboriginal people killed Koalas and other large marsupials for 
food and used their pelts for clothing and as a consequence, forests 
remained rich in biodiversity. As Flannery argues, all over 
Australia, but particularly in the arid zone, once the Aboriginal 
people 'departed' their country, the ecosystem became more 
homogeneous and the biodiversity less able to adapt and 
survive.34 Humans can re-enter ecosystems to recreate past 
biodiversity but this requires that we understand the full 
complexity of predator-prey dynamics, population constraints and 
other ecological parameters such as fire frequency and size. Where 
such knowledge is lacking our best option is to make sure we 
protect continuous habitat that has sufficient biodiversity to be 
self-regulating. Anything less than this is likely to be inadequate 
and condemn our remaining fauna to the list of extinct species 
(see Table 2 below).
In the past, our biodiversity lived in fear of our ignorance. The 
fact is we no longer are killing our biodiversity out of ignorance. 
We know we are losing our biodiversity and we know what must 
be done to protect it. Our wildlife are now living in fear of our 
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Table 2. The Matrix of Ethics and Biodiversity Protection Options
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N icky is standing over there by the edge of the field looking at something. He's the one that killed Caspar. He and his friend Rocco. We can't prove it though, since 
no one actually saw them, and we never found Caspar's body.
He doesn’t notice me right away, then he does, and I watch the 
way his body suddenly goes on alert. He stares at me for a 
moment, and even though he's still fifty feet away, I can see his 
eyes. He starts coming toward me, and I stop where I am on the 
gravel road to see what he will do. As he gets closer, he slows his 
pace and starts crouching down, his eyes still fixed on me. It's as if 
he's in slow motion, one leg slowly going out in front of the 
other. By the time he reaches me his stomach is practically 
scraping the ground, and his ears are pulled back. It's what they do 
if they think you're more powerful than they are and they don't 
want a fight.
He looks up at me now with his weird eyes. One is brown and 
normal-looking, but the other is pale blue, so it looks fake, like a 
glass eye. I never know which eye to look at.
'Murderer/ I say to him. He just looks at me. So I say it again, not 
yelling, but low and quiet, and icy cold.
He takes this as a sign that it's okay to get up, and he does, though 
he's still doing his slow motion thing, and his ears are so far back 
his eyes are bulging. He begins to sniff cautiously at my right 
pocket.
Not for you/ I say. 'Not for murderers.' I give him a hard look, 
and continue on my walk up the gravel road. I
I have never liked dogs. I'm a cat person. What I carry in my 
pocket is for my own protection. People are very inconsiderate 
when it comes to their dogs.They must think people enjoy having 
a strange animal bark and snarl at them and nip at their pant legs 
when they re trying to have a pleasant walk or run. I like to keep 
things friendly, so I always come prepared. It's amazing what a 
biscuit will do to tame up a snarling dog.
47
There's a leash law, even out here in the county, but most people 
ignore it. Most of the loose dogs stay pretty close to home, though. 
Guarding their turf, my husband calls it. But others, like Nicky, 
think they own the world.
I used to chase him off our land whenever I saw him.There was 
Caspar to think about. I'd yell 'Go home! Nicky, go home!' and 
sometimes wave a broom. After a while he'd cringe when he 
heard my voice, even if I was just out talking to a neighbor and he 
happened to be around.
I can't believe he's following me now, but he is. He's never done 
that before. I turn and look behind me and he stops. When I stare 
at him, he starts slinking toward the ground again.
Once, during our first year here, I looked out the window and saw 
Nicky chasing Caspar across the back yard. I ran out on the deck 
and hollered 'Nicky!' just once, as loud as I could, and he stopped 
right in his tracks. Caspar bolted up the back steps and into the 
open door. He was three times his normal size, and his heart was 
pounding like a jackhammer.
He was six months old and already partially declawed when I got 
him. My husband surprised me with him on my 43rd birthday. 
His coat was still creamy, and his tips were a pale bluish grey. He 
would climb up on my chest and put his little paws around my 
neck and nuzzle and purr and look at me with his blue eyes. On 
days when we were home alone, he’d follow me from room to 
room.
Some people think I should have kept Caspar inside all the time, 
since he had no front claws. But Caspar loved to go outside and it 
seemed to me that he had a right to. We have five acres of nice 
rolling fields full of brambles and wild flowers and brome. I 
figured if we watched him, and he had places to hide, he’d be 
okay.
'You're a despicable animal/ I say to Nicky, and continue along 
the road up toward a cluster of houses.
Most of the dogs around here aren't bad ones. Not like Nicky and 
Rocco.You just have to get to know them a little. Like Juliet here. 
She starts barking as I approach, but when she sees it's me she
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smiles and comes running. She's a big orange something—I don't 
know breeds, but she looks like a fat woman stuffed into a thick 
red fox fur coat. When she runs, she heaves her head up and 
down, like a work horse straining with a heavy load. Secretly I call 
her Miss Piggy. She snorts and pushes me a little with her wet 
nose and I reach into my pocket and give her a biscuit.
In a moment Basil appears. He lives next door to Juliet. And then 
Pepper, from the house after that, comes lumbering over. I give 
them both biscuits and they chomp them down and wag their 
tails. By that time Juliet wants another, so I give them all an extra 
half. Pepper was hit by a car once so he limps. He's allergic to fleas; 
I can see the scabs on his back where the bites festered. He and 
Juliet and Basil are pals, and hang out together.
Nicky watches all this from a little way back. He looks like a 
coyote. At least how I think a coyote looks—dark and wild and 
sinewy. Except for his eyes. I don’t think any coyote has a blue 
eye.
Nicky is mostly a loner. Except when Rocco manages to get loose. 
I'll hear some wild barking and look out to the fields across the 
road and see a black tail and a brown tail moving fast above the 
tall grasses. In a little while a head will come up—Nicky's or 
Rocco's. Once I saw them in a field up the road playing with 
something.They were throwing it up in the air and catching it in 
their teeth and having a grand old time.Then I saw that it was a 
groundhog. I shuddered, wondering if it was dead yet.
I give Basil and Pepper and Juliet a pat and then I continue up the 
gravel road. When I turn on to the state road, I see that Nicky is 
still following me. As I go up the tarmac, he falls into step beside 
me. I can hear his hard leathery paws and nails clicking on the 
pavement.
It s dangerous on this state road, and whenever any of the other 
dogs try to follow me, I tell them to go home, and they do. 
Brownie used to live on this road, and she was run over by a car 
last year. She was a nice dog.
but I don't say anything to Nicky. He wanders out into the middle 
°f the road and just barely gets to the other side when a car 
whizzes by. Then he ambles over to the yellow lines in the
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middle sniffing something, and barely moves when another car 
comes. The driver gives me an ugly look. I wish I had a big sign I 
could hang around my neck that said: This is Not My Dog; la m  
Not Responsible.
I wonder for a moment how I would feel if Nicky was hit. I used 
to tell my husband that if any dog ever killed Caspar I would load 
up his .22 and shoot the dog. If I had caught them in the act, I 
would have, too. As it was, I only saw their tails and heads above 
the weeds in the back field one morning. I thought it was a rabbit 
they were hunting. I yelled, and they went loping down the road 
to someone else's yard.
When Caspar didn't come home that night, I hunted all over for 
him, and called and called until my voice was hoarse. I even put 
on my tall boots and started over to where I had seen Nicky and 
Rocco. But it was full of blackberry brambles and thorny wild roses 
and I had to stop. It may be just as well that I didn't find what I'm  
sure was there.
Nicky has found something on the side of the road that interests 
him, and he's sniffing at it enthusiastically. Dogs have amazing 
noses. I often wish I had a nose like that, although what I smelled 
would probably disgust me.
Caspar used to sit in the golden rod and Queen Anne's Lace for 
hours watching and smelling things. Sometimes he brought back 
birds and baby rabbits and ground squirrels in his mouth. I don't 
know how he ever caught them without front claws, but 
somehow he managed. I always scolded him, and tried to take 
whatever he'd caught away from him. But he'd run off and eat it. 
I fed him plenty, so it wasn't that he was hungry. It's what cats do, 
my husband always said.
I reach the stop sign, which is as far as I go, and I turn around and 
start back. Nicky turns with me. I can't believe he's come this far. 
We must be two miles away from where he lives.
When Caspar disappeared and I called all the neighbors to ask 
them to keep an eye out for him, I found out something 
interesting. Caspar used to go to the neighbor's a quarter mile 
away and stroll across her deck. He was quite a character, my 
neighbor said. I had no idea.
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It's been five months now, and sometimes I still hear him. Only 
last month I got up in the middle of the night and ran down to 
the back door. It must have been a trick of the wind.
When we get back to the gravel road, Nicky goes on a little in 
front of me. I can see a callous on his right foreleg. It's dark and 
hard-looking, like the crust on an old wound. He sniffs at 
something and I pass him.I feel him notice, and pull himself 
away from the smell to continue behind me, as if we are together. 
Suddenly this makes me very angry. I turn to face him. His body 
goes on alert again.
'Stop following me!' I yell in my strongest voice. 'Go home!' He 
slouches down at my feet, and rolls over, exposing his stomach, 
the way dogs do to show submissiveness. He stares at me steadily, 
unblinking. I look first at his blue eye, the same blue as Caspar's, 
and then at his brown one. I wonder suddenly what it would feel 
like to sink my shoe hard into his soft belly. But looking at him  
there, stretched out as if to say, Go ahead if it will make you f e e l  
better, I don't feel angry any more. Just kind of sad.
I suppose it's possible that it wasn't Nicky at all. It could have 
been a groundhog. Some huge ones live around here, and Caspar 
may have gotten a little too nosy with one of their burrows. It 
may even have been a fox. Or, who knows? Someone might have 
picked him up and taken him home. He was a such a beautiful, 
loving cat.
I put my hands in my pocket and turn to go. There's still half a 
biscuit there, and my hand falls on it. I take it out and offer it to 
Nicky. He slinks forward and pauses, studying me, as if to say, A re  
you sure? Then, with his eyes still on mine, he takes the biscuit 
delicately from my hand.
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Towards a better press for animals
Denis Mahony
Environmental Education as an education of 
conscience
I work at environmental education. By this I mean that while environmental education is the major component of my professional life, it is not confined within these boundaries. 
How I eat and travel, what I buy, where I put my waste, the 
judgements I make about the actions of government, industry 
and business, increasingly invade the formerly comfortable 
realms of my consciousness and conscience. This whole process 
constantly challenges me to reinterpret what environmental 
education means.
I would like to comment on two aspects of this. Firstly, when I 
seek to apply this change in my thinking to the subject's rationale, 
I am most comfortable in placing it in the domains of 
epistemology, ontology and ethics; epistemology because I see this 
way of knowing as experiential and subjective, rather than expert 
and objective. I look to ontology and ethics because, when I seek 
to simplify the plethora of definitions that introduce 
environment education documents, I find they are essentially 
about the human-nature relationship, and about how far to 
extend human compassion into the non-human world.
The second point is that change is the central focus of this 
understanding of environmental education, whether viewed 
from a personal perspective, as I have recounted, or as something 
affecting whole societies. This change is made more problematic 
because of its intrusion into personal space, and because it 
confronts commonly held/hidden understandings of human 
epistemology, ontology and ethics.
The environmental education literature shows a preference for 
discussing these matters in the generalised language of 'world 
view', 'ideology' and 'paradigm shift'. Much of the writing 
presents environmental world views or ideologies as vigorously 
contested, with a basic polarisation resulting from human-centred 
and nature-centred poles. Two and four-category representations
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predominate. The first distinguishes the Dominant Social 
Paradigm (DSP) (low valuation on nature, compassion restricted 
to those near and dear, accepting risks in order to maximise 
wealth, unlimited growth, and satisfaction with present society 
and politics) from the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP), 
which challenges each of these value/belief positions.1 The 
second commonly subdivides the DSP into Cornucopian and 
Accomodationist/Managerialist ('Light Green') positions and the 
NEP into Deep Ecology ('Dark Green') and Social Ecology ('Red 
Green') positions.2 Ecofeminism is a particular orientation of 
Social Ecology.
While a challenge to change our ideas, values and beliefs is 
central to the New Environmental Paradigm, in the four part 
scale, the focus is more on defining variations of the original 
classification, and the reader may form the impression that these 
are equally-spaced positions on a continuum. It is true that, in the 
West, 'deep green-ness' has dragged the fulcrum of 
environmentalism from the Cornucopian to the Light Green 
position.3 But as Sharon Beder has argued, there is a fundamental 
discontinuity between the Light Green and Deep/Red Green 
positions4 which my own research supports.5 The environmental 
education literature seldom ventures into the areas of subjectivity 
and experiential knowing, which together form the pathway 
which has led me to my understanding of what environmental 
education is. It is consistent with this epistemology to view the 
collective education part of this as a sharing of our individual 
stories, a process which respects subjectivity and experiential 
knowing, while contributing to the search for a change in the 
collective human-nature relationship.
1 There are many variations of this in the Environmental Education literature. I 
have drawn mine from John Gien, Education for the Environment, (Deakin 
University Press, Geelong, 1993), p.25.
2 Ibid., p.27.
Timothy O'Riordan, 'On the Greening of Major Projects', The Geographical 
Journal, 156, (1990), p.144; see also D. Scott Slocombe, 'Environmentalism: A 
Modern Synthesis', The Environmentalist, 4, (1984).
Activism versus Negotiation: Strategies for the Environment Movement', 
Geopolitics V Proceedings, ed. Ronnie Harding (University of New South Wales,
Taking a Position: Subjectivity, Paradigm Shift and a Critical-Interpretive 
Approach to Environmental Education', in press for Ecopolitics X Proceedings , 
(Australian National University, 1998).
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Stories which I and others tell about paradigm shift experiences 
are sometimes based on a 'critical incident'.6 As understood in 
traditional biographies, a critical incident refers to a significant 
change or turning point in a person's life, but David Tripp adds 
another meaning:
I extend 'critical incident' to include the commonplace 
events that occur in the everyday life of a classroom. 
Such incidents are rendered critical by the author by 
being seen as indicative of underlying trends, motives 
and structures, and are often presented to teachers in 
the form of a dilemma in which they have a choice of at 
least two mutually exclusive courses of action.7
I have applied Tripp's concept to an insight into the discontinuity 
between the Light Green and Deep/Red Green positions, which 
constitutes a breakthrough in the dominant culture's 
conditioning of our environmental ideology. It is akin to the 
conversion experience described in detail by Nancy Dudley.8 In 
my case, subjective research, via a critical incident, audited my 
values and brought me to identify with a forest community. This 
was not a totally pleasant experience: I discovered that I loved and 
championed the forest to the detriment of my desire to be 
accepted by some of my human community. At times I felt angry, 
sad, determined, alienated, insecure - but beyond all this, I was 
sure that this was where I wanted to be.
I suspect that critical incidents are rare experiences, and not 
something that can be easily incorporated into an environmental 
education context, although the experiential education 
methodology can attempt to do so.9 The term 'conscientisation' 
refers to an adjustment of our moral judging to include what may 
be good or bad for the natural world, and is seen as contributing
6 Denis Mahony, 'Green Stories: The Experience of Environmental Commitment', 
Earthlinks '97. Proceedings of the 9th Biennial Conference of the Australian 
Association for Environmental Education (University of Tasmania, Hobart, 
1997). See the stories told by Denis, Mary and Col.
7 'Teachers' Lives, Critical Incidents, and Professional Practice', Qualitative 
Studies in Education, 7, (1994), p.69.
8 'The experience of changing to a new world view: A phenomenological study of 
the emergent paradigm shift'. A Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, (University 
of Victoria, Canada, 1987).
9 See Barry Law, 'Experiential Learning in Environmental Education', World 
Heritage Visions and Values, Biennial Conference of the Association for 
Environmental Education, (September, 1994, Cairns, Australia).
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to an education for  the environment, within a critical pedagogy.10 
In this respect it exemplifies the experiential-subjective 
epistemology I have been advocating. The remainder of this 
discussion will be based on this conscientisation approach.
It is not so difficult to accept the challenge to adjust our 
consciences to include compassion for non-human creatures 
when a particular environment or species is presented as being 
under threat, and occupies centre stage. In these cases, the battle 
lines are clearly drawn, and press reports commonly look to 
representatives of the human and non-human ethical positions 
to state their opposing cases. My concern here is with inform al 
environmental education, where animals are included in the 
content of a press report, but the values they represent are not the 
primary focus. In such instances those interviewed, the journalist, 
editor, or illustrator, inadvertently teach readers about the worth 
of the animals. In this scenario, I argue, there is an obvious need 
to look to our conscience for a moral judgement.
Press coverage of selected animals and habitats
My purpose here is to illustrate this incidental cultural 
representation of animals in the press in three categories: animals 
in the wild, domesticated animals, and the places where animals 
live. My selection of newspaper extracts is not the result of a 
systematic survey, but a concentration of my ethical attention on 
the values being assigned to selected animals as I did my usual 
reading of local, regional and national Australian newspapers. I 
have in fact been tracking my own conscientisation, flowing on 
from the 'critical incident' awareness that commenced when I 
read the chapter on animal testing and factory farming in Peter 
Singer's Animal Liberation, and which was further advanced 
when I felt compelled to intervene for the sake of my local forest 
community.
Among references to animals in the wild, larger animals living in 
the ocean appear to be objects of ambivalent regard. While I have 
read of concerns about beached whales, the 'by-catch' from netting 
(including driftnets), the live fish trade to Asia, and occasional 
murmurs about the damage resulting from plastic flotsam and 
the shark meshing of swimming beaches, game fishing seems to 
be quarantined from any ethical attention.
10 Fien, Education for the Environment.
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Extract one
'Shark catch sets record for boy'
It was first time lucky yesterday for Chad Nelson, who 
beat a NSW and Australian junior record by landing a 
214kg mako shark. Chad, 10, of Swansea, had his first 
chance on the rod yesterday after accompanying his 
. father, Mr Bob Nelson, for the past three months on 
game fishing trips on Scotch Mist, a boat owned by Mr. 
Col Hutchinson. The boat was in 65 fathoms of water off 
Merewether when Chad hooked the deadly shark with a 
10kg. line. Four hours and five minutes later he landed 
his catch, exhausted. Chad's mother, Mrs Colleen 
Nelson, said last night that the previous junior record 
for a mako shark was set in 1988 with a 92kg. The new 
record would be verified with the NSW Game Fishing 
Association this week. The shark was dumped out to sea 
because its weight rendered it potentially harmful to eat 
through mercury contamination. Chad will keep the 
jaws as a memento.
The Newcastle Herald 
29 March 1993
When I read this, I was struck by the contrast between the praise 
heaped on the boy and the negative esteem accorded to the shark. 
The article appears under a photo (twice the column space of the 
text) which shows a smiling boy with one hand resting on the 
head of the dead shark, which is suspended by its tail, the reporter 
tells us it was the boy's 'first chance on the rod', he only used a 
10kg. line, and the four hours and five minutes activity left him 
exhausted. Meanwhile the shark is regarded as 'deadly' or at best 
an object (described as 'the shark', the boy's 'catch', or 'it', rather 
than a gendered being). There is no mention of how the shark felt 
about its four hour and five minutes experience, and after the 
weighing, photographing, and dissection to obtain the jaws for a 
memento (a symbol of deadliness?), its body was 'dumped' at sea 
because its flesh had been poisoned. The newspaper staff and, by 
inference, the game fishing interest group, seem oblivious to 
what I saw as an amazing denigration of this non-human animal.
Extract Two
'Catch of a lifetime for junior angler'
After four hours of "constant play" with a 109 kg striped 
marlin, Robert Besoff reeled in the biggest catch of his
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life on Sunday evening and broke an Australian junior 
game fishing record in the process.
The 12-year-old Toronto High pupil had good reason 
to brag yesterday after breaking the junior record for 
striped marlin (105 kg), which is listed by the Game 
Fishing Association of Australia.
Robert caught the marlin on Sunday when he was 
fishing with his father, Paul, and friends on his father's 
38ft Riviera game fishing boat, Kazoo.
Robert's mother, Mrs Debbie Besoff, spoke of her 
son's prize catch from her Fishing Point home yesterday 
while her son attended school.
Mrs. Besoff said Robert and her husband went to fish 
for sharks at a deep-sea location near the continental 
shelf known as The Canyons, 70km south-east of 
Swansea Heads.
“They were actually fishing for sharks out there," 
Mrs Besoff said. "Just a few weeks ago Robert was 
fighting a really big tiger shark for a few hours but he 
ended up losing it."
"But there are also some big marlin out there and 
this one actually took the shark bait."
Robert played the fish for four and a half hours before 
reeling it in. It was weighed about 8pm at the Swansea 
Game fishing Weight Station to qualify for the 
Australian record and junior world record.
"It's a really great honour as the Australian record 
he's broken has been standing for the past eight to ten 
years," Mrs. Besoff said.
"Four and a half hours of constant play with a fish is 
quite a feat; a marlin can knock a man around."
"It's a very difficult sport...and marlins are 
particularly hard to catch. They jump around a lot and 
they're fast swimmers and just rush up to the surface. 
You've got to keep the line taught [sic] all the time and 
it's very hard going; you've got a lot of weight on you."
"Paul's played fish and sharks for up to ten hours at 
times. You don't often get a really good catch when 
everything goes right. So many things can go wrong and 
that's what makes it such a triumph. Actually landing it 
close to dark and breaking a record...Robert's ecstatic."
With Robert a junior member of Lake Macquarie 
Game Fishing Club, Mrs. Besoff said the sport ran in 
the family, with her father-in-law, George Besoff, and 
her father and brother Jack and John Heathfield, well- 
known game fishermen in their time.
She said Robert had been fishing "since he could 
hold a rod", but became involved in game fishing only 
in the past 12 months.
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To qualify for the junior world record, the 
equipment Robert used, including the rod and line, 
must be sent to the United States for verification for the 
world record. Mr. Paul Besoff said there was no junior 
world record for striped marlin and the category was 
vacant as it was created only recently.
Gillian McNally 
The Newcastle Herald 
22 April 1997
There are some similarities with the previous extract. There are 
two photographs occupying twice the column space of the text, 
one replicating the boy-and-dead-animal pose, and the other 
showing the boy with rod under full strain, over the stem of his 
father's boat. Again the focus is on a boy's achievement in 
establishing a record. It is a great honour, a triumph, which makes 
the boy justifiably ecstatic and gives him 'good reason to brag'. It 
took a similar time to accomplish (about four and a half hours). 
Although the striped marlin is not represented as inherently 
dangerous, 'a marlin can knock a man around'. We are not told 
about what happened to the fish after its death and the weighing-
photographing ritual, but the report suggests that the value of 
these animals lies only in their capacity to be 'played', and so 
hooking the marlin was a bonus beyond the intended sharks, 
because the former will intensify the battle/victory experience for 
the humans.
Figure 1. The Newcastle Herald 22 .4 .97
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This story is also used by Lewis, the newspaper's cartoonist, to 
satirise a political event (Figure 1). The cartoon depicts a white- 
coated 'judge' distracted from his task of taking details from the 
boy (posing alongside the marlin), by an Australian 
fisherman/prime-minister gesticulating about his 'one that got 
away', seen in the background as an enormous senator-fish, 
which has battered the prime minister, wretched his gear and 
sunk his boat, Two additional messages are conveyed: there is a 
characterisation of undesirable human qualities by fitting them 
into animal form which I will discuss with regard to some other 
examples; and in this cartoon the marlin trophy has a winner's 
rosette attached, inscribed with 'Aussie Record', which to my 
mind reinforces the 'Australian-ness' of the activity - a healthy 
outdoor sport, winning against the odds, and in a family setting. 
Confining the value of the marlin to a 'prize catch in this patriotic 
context, makes a contrary sentient valuing even more difficult.
Extract Three
'Record marlin catches off Port Stephens'
Phenomenal results from game-fishing tournaments 
out of Port Stephens during the past two weeks has 
elevated the "blue-water wonderland" to one of the 
world's best marlin waters.
The result smashed the 1000 tagged marlin 
milestone, which is more than any tournament in the 
world.
In seven days of fishing, 1340 billfish were caught, 
and in modern game fishing with the accent on 
conservation and tag-and-release very much the norm, 
only 36 were taken and weighted.
The NSW Inter-Club Game Fishing Tournament, 
held each year has always been considered one of the 
premier game-fishing tournaments, even by world 
standards, and was held over the past two weekends.
Between the weekends, Monday was Ladies Day and 
on Tuesday and Wednesday anglers fished in the 
Australian International Billfish Tournament.
During the first two days of fishing there were an 
incredible 543 marlin tagged and released by 230 boats.
Normally a day's marlin fishing is considered 
successful if a boat has half a dozen strikes and hooks up 
two fish, but during the tournament boats were 
reporting anything up to 20 strikes with 10 and 15 tags.
On Monday, 59 boats fished in the ladies-only 
competition and tagged 68 marlin, while on Tuesday
59
and Wednesday another 259 marlin were tagged, with 
last weekend pushing the total to 1340.
The marlin have come down the coast with a warm 
tropical current which has pushed the water 
temperatures up to 26 degrees, and contains huge 




This extract reports on a seven day game-fishing competition 
offshore from a marine-based holiday resort some hundred 
kilometres north of Sydney, during which 1340 marlin were 
caught. As well as giving details of the catch, the reporter makes 
two points. The first notes that the total score is a new 
international record for such a tournament, which 'elevates the 
"blue water wonderland" to one of the world's best m arlin 
waters'. This is another example of accrediting game fishing by 
providing it with contemporary cultural values. In this instance it 
is another Australian winner and a means of attracting tourist 
dollars. The second point relates that all the marlin except 36 were 
tagged and released, which typifies 'modem game fishing with the 
accent on conservation'. While this is undoubtedly an 
improvement, I would regard the statement as a very human- 
centred idea of conservation, once again with no recognition of 
the marlins' perspective. This is also illustrated by the caption 
under one of the photos accompanying the text, referring to a 
marlin 'dancing' across the ocean after being hooked.
The final illustration in this group is a photo showing two 
Australian test cricketers on tour in South Africa (Figure 2). They 
are framed by two dolphins leaping high out of the water in 
unison, and the caption makes a word play on 'flipper', 
associating the dolphins' limb with a bowler's trick ball. Probably 
few would object to the association made here, but my conscience 
is unhappy not only with these animals being held captive and 
made to perform for human pleasure and gain, but the added 
trivialisation and reinforcement of their condition, by the 
dolphins being made to carry some banter about Australian 
cricketing prowess. The last is a source of considerable national 
pride, and there is a subtle value transfer implied of a similar 
kind to that intended by cigarette advertisers, where a wholesome
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Figure 2. The Sydney Morning Herald 15.3.1997.
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value (like enjoying outdoor recreation) is associated with one 
that is ethically questionable.
The next extract is different in that it does not exhibit the bland 
indifference of the fishing people and the reporters to the sea 
animals. Instead the animal is 'demonised'.
Extract four
'Vicious kangaroo attack'
Weston man's horrifying ordeal.
Exclusive: David Quick
A Weston pensioner is still in a state of shock after a 
fight to the death with a huge rogue kangaroo at 
Richmond Vale on Monday. The 71-year-old man, 
Mr.John Hall, was attacked by the monster kangaroo 
early Monday morning while he was quietly picking 
mushrooms and says he is lucky to be alive.
Mr. Hall suffered severe lacerations to his face, right 
arm and stomach but was able to stay the beast with his 
pocket knife in a close quarters struggle.
His cries for help were eventually heard by rural 
workers in the area who rushed Mr Hall to Kurri 
hospital.
He was later allowed home after treatment for severe 
lacerations.
Still dazed and weak from the extraordinary ordeal, 
and with one arm encased in plaster, Mr Hall was barely 
able to talk about it yesterday.
"I had often picked mushrooms in the area before 
and had seen kangaroos. I know from experience to be 
wary of them and we simply ignored each other."
"On this occasion, though, it might be the mating 
season or something, it was different," Mr Hall said.
"I was bending down getting wild mushrooms and 
when I stood up the roo was rearing over me. He must 
have been more than 6ft to do that."
"He was obviously cranky and making snarling 
hissing noises. I tried to gently back away thinking a 
peaceful retreat might work but the roo followed me, 
swiping at me with his forelegs. Each time those razor 
sharp claws took lumps out of my arm. The smell of 
blood seemed to make him more aggressive."
"The next thing I know he had knocked me to the 
ground and then I knew I was in real trouble."
"I've never been so scared because I've seen what 
these things can do when they rake with their back 
legs."
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"I'll never get over it. Normally I pick the 
mushrooms, but on Monday I had decided to use my 
small pocket knife instead and as real good luck would 
have it, it was in my hand."
"Without it, I wouldn't have had a chance. I was so 
terrified that I really didn't know what was happening 
but no matter how old you are, instinct for survival 
makes you fight like hell and I instinctively stabbed at 
the beast, all the time shouting for help and realising 
what little chance there is of killing a big roo with a 
pocket knife."
"I feel it was largely my own fault in being too 
complacent, a false sense of security."
Mr Hall, who was born in Abermain and knows the 
bush well, says his ordeal is a lesson for others.
"I didn't want this publicity, but to get the message 
across that all these animals are dangerous. Even in a 
park, I wouldn't let a child go near a kangaroo or an 
Emu."




It appears that this man had a frightening and dangerous 
encounter with a kangaroo. The manner in which this event is 
interpreted reveals not only the expected anthropocentric 
perspective (tempered here by the throwaway line, 'It might have 
been mating season or something.') but it also goes far beyond this 
to rewrite the event as an epic and heroic struggle between man 
and beast. The lines of battle are clearly drawn by representing the 
man as aged (and a pensioner), (almost) defenceless, engaged in a 
simple rural activity ('quietly picking mushrooms'), and avoiding 
confrontation ('I know from experience to be wary of them.'). But 
the beast is a 'monster' and a 'rogue', 'cranky', 'vicious' and 
'aggressive' (particularly after it smelled blood), emitting 'snarling 
hissing noises', and armed with 'razor sharp claws'. The man is 
forced into a 'fight to the death' and, against the odds, manages to 
'slay' the beast with nothing but his pocket knife.
The story has a moral, delivered with the authority of a man who 
'knows the bush well', that 'all these animals are dangerous', 
particularly to children. It is instructive to contrast this 
interpretation of a frightening and dangerous encounter with Val
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Plumwood's unadorned narrative of her near-death crocodile 
experience.11
The media reconstruction of these events illustrates well that 
'deep-seated fear of "non-human" nature [which is] portrayed as 
evil, random, and innately aggressive' described in Doyle, Dyer 
and Stratford's report on the media coverage of the 1994 New 
South Wales bushfires. 'Bushfires, along with earthquakes and 
floods are media events par excellence. They show how fearsome 
nature is at work, how weak and how vulnerable humans are'.1 2
I turn now to domesticated animals.
Extract Five
'Egg firm awaits Lake go-ahead'
Ringal Valley Pty Ltd, the Lake Macquarie egg company 
that has agreed to run the egg farm proposed for Green 
Point, has indicated that it may have to leave the region 
if the project does not go ahead. At the same time, the 
Newcastle branch of the Animal Liberation group has 
signalled that if the development does proceed it will 
stage protests at Green Point, with the backing of the 
organisation's national office.
An Animal Liberation spokesman, Mr. Mark 
Pearson, said yesterday that the group would initially 
lobby members of Lake Macquarie City Council to try to 
have the 120,000-hen egg farm refused.
The managing director of Ringal Valley, Mr. Ian 
Livingstone, said yesterday that his family's firm had 
lent its support to the project as a way of updating its 
own production equipment and complying with new 
State Government regulations that will, from 1995, 
require larger cages for battery hen farms.
Mr Livingstone said there was no other land in 
eastern Lake Macquarie large enough to accommodate 
the sort of modern egg facility that Ringal Valley has 
been asked to manage by the owners of most of Green 
Point, McCloys Pty Ltd.
He said the company had already been looking at 
moving to the Tamworth area, where it already had
11 'Kakadu: The Land of the Crocodile', Australian Wilderness Series No. 2 
(Kestral Filins Production, Richmond, Victoria, 1989).
12 Tim Doyle, Ken Dyer and Elaine Stratford, 'The 1994 New South Wales 
bushfires: Three Voices from the Wilderness', Ecopolitics VIII. Proceedings 
(Lincoln University, Canterbury, New Zealand, 1995), pp.193-209.
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four farms, before the McCloys offer was made and 
would do so again if the project did not proceed.
This included whether Lack Macquarie City Council 
refused approval for the $3.5million egg farm, or 
whether McCloys shelved the plan in the event of 
gaining its preferred option of developing half of its 
holding for residential purposes and donating the rest 
for a public park.
"We have been farmers in this part of Lake 
Macquarie since 1938." Mr Livingstone said.
"Our intention is to continue living here because we 
love it."
"This is where our market is and this is where we 
want to stay."
"To get another opportunity like this we would need 
to move to Tamworth."
Mr Livingstone said Ringal Valley, started by his 
grandfather, had about 7% of the NSW egg market and 
employed 80 people at Belmont North, Wyong, Kurri 
Kurri and Tamworth. He said he hoped that the Green 
Point project did not become an animal welfare issue, 
because the planned egg farm was intended to be the 
most modem such facility in the world.
Birds would be kept in air-conditioned and 
humidity-controlled sheds, safe from predators.
At the end of their laying life they would be taken 
from the egg farm to a meat processing plant off Green 
Point.
"The success of a farmer depends on how he cares for 
his stock". Mr Livingstone said. "The welfare of our 
birds is our number one consideration."
But Animal Liberation's Mr Mark Pearson said the 
egg farm planned for Green Point would be a 
"concentration camp for birds".
Mr Pearson said that under current regulations each 
bird had a caged floor space less than the size of an A4 
sheet of paper.That would increase to about A4 size after 
1995.
Birds were placed under enormous stress, they 
constantly pecked at one another and their bones 




The newsworthiness of this issue derives at least partly from the 
fact that there is considerable interest in the future of this still 
undeveloped Green Point land on the shores of Lake Macquarie, a
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large saltwater lake system on the southern side of Newcastle, 
New South Wales. This newspaper report is unusual in that the 
hens have a human champion, whose assertive statements (like 
'a concentration camp for birds') force the egg company manager 
to justify his treatment of the hens. His arguments that the 
proposed project should not be regarded as an animal welfare 
issue are: that the facility will be modern; that the air breathed by 
the hens will be temperature and humidity controlled; and that 
they will be safe from predators. As reported by the newspaper, 
the manager's summative statement asserts that the interests of 
the birds are synonymous with those of the farmer. But these are 
clearly commercial interests: the hens are 'stock', and a 'laying life' 
equals their life term, after which the short trip to the 'meat' 
processing plant is the natural next step, unworthy of any 
justifying comment. This choice of descriptors illustrates how 
language can be used to narrow ethical considerations almost to 
the point of extinction, as Val Plumwood explains in her 
discussion of the Babe achievement.13 The telling confirmation 
here comes both from the manager's apparent belief that there 
cannot possibly be any animal welfare issue involved, and the 
prominence the newspaper gives to the implied economic 
consequences of non-approval by Lake Macquarie City Council.
WHY THE FREE MARKET IS
Figure 3. The Weekend Australian 8-9 .3 .97
13 Val Plumwood, 'Babe: The Tale of the Speaking Meat', Part 1, Animal Issues, 
1, (1997), pp.21-36.
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My next concern is about the representation of pigs. All three 
examples are in the form of illustrations. Figure 3 illustrates a 
double page article on 'Why the free market is a danger to 
democracy', in which the author argues that in the post cold war 
period, the threat now comes from within. The laissez-faire 
capitalist ideology has spawned 'local tyrants' and some sovereign 
states bent on pursuing self interest with no regard for the 
common good. This important but intellectually weighty article 
in the general reading section of a weekend newspaper clearly 
needs illustrating, and the editor is not mean in allocating space. 
The figure spreads across both (large format) pages and measures a 
remarkable 51x22 cms. But even more remarkable to my 
conscience is the illustration chosen to convey this message about 
human greed. The Sturt Krygesman drawing is remarkably 
evocative; the flight of marauding pigs is tearing apart the cloth-
like surface of planet earth with their teeth and 'hands' while 
dressed in pin-striped suit coats, and further adorned with large 
diamond rings, cigars and a dollar tattoo on their naked thighs. 
But it is their demeanour that is most striking: slobbering jaws are 
agape, showing huge teeth, or clamped tight over tom-apart earth 
fabric, with tusk-like molars protruding. Beady eyes almost lost in 
faces screwed tight with a lust to devour, they claw at each other 
to better get to their victim.
To my mind, the illustration carries a far more effective message 
than the text: perhaps about corporate greed, but also that pigs are 
a natural metaphor to illustrate human aberrations concerning 
heartless and violent greed.
Figure 4. The Sydney Morning Herald 10.4.97
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The next pig illustration (Figure 4) combines filth with greed. This 
cartoon by Moir, in The Sydney Morning Herald, shows an 
Australian senator-pig wallowing in a huge black-muck-filled 
trough happily throwing fish skeletons etc. over himself, while 
other politicians (in their normal human likeness) are also in the 
trough, arguing heatedly with each other.
Pork Suppl,ers K
'HGREOtENTS: POR*
----- «4N T IflOiV SOOIUM «
Figure 5. Illustration from  a Leg Ham Wrapper
Finally, Figure 5 argues pig connivance with humans' decision to 
eat them (and by implication with the 'farming' methods 
involved). It comes from the wrapper of a full leg ham. The picnic 
theme is carried by the pig family (males only) partly dressed in 
human clothing suitable for the outdoors, in smiling relaxed 
poses. The human disguise is beguiling. I had to do a 'second take' 
to recall the reality of what really happens to the animal part 
under the wrapper's picture ('absent referents'14). But the amazing 
message here is that the pigs actually embrace their destiny as a 
picnic repast of humans, by becoming part of the marketing team. 
This manner of advertising is also used in the highly competitive 
cooked 'chicken' meat marketing, as in 'Henny Penny', which 
makes the barbecued poultry 'one of us', by commandeering the
14 Carol Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat (Continuum, New York, 1994), p.40.
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Australian custom of adding a 'y' to make a nickname. Notice also 
the appeal to (100%) 'Australian-ness'.
Finally, there are newspaper extracts that see environments as 
existing only for humans, ignoring any possibility that they may 
be homes for many other species.
Extract Six
'$1.5m home for entire fishing fleet'
An interesting but tatty comer of Throsby Creek is about 
to undergo a $1.5million redevelopment which will see 
Newcastle's entire fishing fleet moored together.
The NSW Public Works Department's Acting 
Regional Manager, Mr Paul Gilbertson, said yesterday 
that a contract would be let in the next couple of weeks 
for the four months work involved in extending the 
present jetty to add 25 new moorings to the current 24.
The 49 berths would be sufficient to house 
Newcastle's entire fishing fleet. Public Works was also 
building a car park to accommodate a further 28 
vehicles, landscaping the area and including an 
amenities block for the fishermen.
Mr Gilbertson said the area of the creek around the 
existing jetty was being dredged to allow for the extra 
moorings and the 30,000 tonnes of spoil was being 
deposited on the Carrington side of the creek, between 
Elizabeth and Howden Streets.
The Newcastle Herald 
9 May 1993
At first, uncritical reading simply absorbs a directory of public 
works which now enable all of Newcastle's fishing fleet, the boat 
owners, and their vehicles to be located at the one site with 
functional and attractive facilities. Re-read from a non-human 
perspective, there is a whole absent referent community here, 
described by the writer as a 'tatty corner of Throsby Creek'. It was 
an estuarine community, whose sea grasses, mangroves and salt 
marshes would have provided a nursery/habitat for fish, 
molluscs, crustaceans and birds, but which has now been dredged, 
smothered in 30,000 tonnes of spoil and 'landscaped', in order to 
accommodate a community of humans, boats and automobiles.
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Extract Seven
'Police warn of drain cult'
A cult of ditch kids is growing up in the city section of 
Black Creek - Cessnock's open canal storm water drain 
system - a senior police officer has warned.
Senior Sergeant Gordon Gorton told the Advertiser 
this week that the concrete sided storm water drains 
provide a security screen, a playground and an escape 
route for everything from break and enters, drug taking, 
under-age drinking and smoking to just plain 
vandalism.
"Kids ride motor bikes from Nulkaba and emerge on 
the western side of Cessnock Ex-Services Club."
"It's a hot-bed not a river bed and is nurturing 
juvenile delinquency. Just look at the shopping trolleys, 
beer bottles and other things deliberately tossed into it." 
said Snr Sgt Gorton.
So far not announced is the fact that Cessnock Rugby 
League Supporters Club, which has a major stretch of 
the inner city water course running past its front door, is 
well ahead with plans for a $4 million refurbishment to 
the building.
The plans will include putting a half million dollar 
lid on 50m of the watercourse, from the corner of the 
building to the pedestrian bridge joining the car parks, 
which will then become car parking.
Snr Sgt Gorton sees this as a possible opportunity to 
put a halt to the community's "ditch kids" problem.
"I don't know how feasible it is, but it seems to me 
that if the equipment and resources are there doing one 
section it may well be possible to cover in the primary 
problem section around the Plaza area at a reasonable 
and affordable cost," Snr Sgt Gordon said.
Mr John Knipe, secretary manager of Cessnock 
Rugby League Supporters Club has confirmed that 
development plans for the project will be put before 
council possibly as early as next week.
"It is true that we have had clearance from the 
Hunter Water Corporation to cover in our stretch of the 
canal. It is very early days yet and while we have met all 
the required specifications and conditions from the 




The feelings of sadness I experienced when I reflected on the 
voiceless lost estuarine community were amplified when I 
thought of the original Black Creek community. The stream 
acquired its name from the Aboriginal clan which periodically 
lived on its banks and drew its food from the animal and plant 
life existing there. It does not require a lot of imagination to 
realise the contrast between that vital and varied Black Creek 
community and the present cement storm water drain 
harbouring a community of criminals. The earlier catastrophe in 
the stream community's demise occurred when its vegetation was 
removed and the stream's migrating meanders were confined 
within a u-shaped concrete structure. Concerns about 'a cult of 
ditch kids' now threatens to banish this part of Black Creek 
underground, providing a car park bonus in addition to a possible 
solution to the city's social problem.
Conclusion
I have argued here that environmental education is 
fundamentally subjective and experiential, and is concerned with 
a paradigm shift operating in both personal and social domains. 
This includes an extension of ethical concern to the non-human 
world, which in a pedagogical context is called conscientisation. I 
have endeavoured to illustrate how this works for me by drawing 
on the unintended but powerful informal education carried by 
the media, using newspaper extracts, illustrations, photos, 
cartoons and product advertising. What I have been sharing with 
you is in fact part of my journey-story, which I hope may 
contribute something to the humankind journey-story of 
rapprochement with the natural world. It seems to me that 
reflective story telling is a worthwhile epistemology for the kind 
of environmental education I have described, and I was greatly 
reassured to see this approach taken by Freya Mathews in the first 
article in the first issue of Animal Issues.15
My reflections on my own experiences convince me that the 
paradigm shift to an ecocentric position is demanding and 
evolutionary, as Dudley's detailed research indicates, and 
something we should think of sharing rather than teaching. 
Certainly it is a matter of creditability to me that I participate in 
this way. But the demanding element applies not so much to the 
adoption of the 'Light Green' accomodationist/managerialist
15 'Living with Animals', Animal Issues, 1. (1997), pp.4-20.
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ideology, which does not fundamentally challenge those 
contemporary social values and institutional structures that 
estrange us from the natural world. Rather we should consider 
the leap across the divide towards that identification with nature, 
commonly described as deep ecology or social ecology. I doubt if 
this is something we can achieve unconsciously, although I 
concede that we may well be driven to it as a consequence of a 
looming ecocrisis. But in so much as this change process can 
involve that 'mindful, willing participation' identified by Dudley, 
the 'critical incident' and conscientisation strategies have proved 
useful in helping me focus on human-nature values which have 
escaped cultural conditioning.
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Review Essay
de W aal, Frans, Good Natured: The origins o f  right and wrong in 
humans and other animals, viii + 218pp. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996.
G ood Natured is an elegant book, easy to read, beautifully illustrated and moderate in tone. Frans de Waal professes an aversion to dichotomy and, while he asserts 
his own views with confidence, he is rarely dismissive of the 
conflicting views of others. Nothing better illustrates this 
characteristic than de Waal's treatment of Richard Dawkins, one 
of the most vociferous exponents of the notion that human 
beings are bom selfish. Although he questions the wisdom of 
anthropomorphising the gene as Dawkins does in the title of his 
book, The Selfish Gene, de Waal agrees with Dawkins that 
genetic self-interest at the expense of others is the basic thrust of 
evolution, but he also argues that, paradoxically, in some species, 
our own included, the selfish gene has given rise to 
unselfishness, to a natural capacity for caring and sharing which is 
the source of human morality.
It is de Waal's contention that there can be no satisfactory account 
of human morality without a consideration of evolution, but it is 
not the main purpose of his book to speculate on how morality 
might have evolved. De Waal's aim is to produce convincing 
evidence that many of the tendencies and capacities underlying 
human morality are to be found in other animals, especially in 
our nearest relatives. He does not claim that members of other 
species should be regarded as moral beings, nor does he 
undervalue our much-vaunted capacity for moral reasoning, he 
simply claims that the foundations of morality have been with us 
from the very beginning. We are by nature 'good' as well as 
selfish.
It may be appropriate, at this point, to reassure any potential 
readers who have an aversion to prescriptive views of human 
nature and who may be deterred by what they perceive as a whiff 
of biological determinism. The human nature of which de Waal 
speaks is remarkable above all for its plasticity. Like other 
members of the primate order, human beings are diverse as 
individuals, variable in their associations and capable of adapting
73
to even radical changes in their circumstances. In the human 
species, this last capacity has been so enhanced by advances in 
technology that it seems almost boundless, and de Waal does 
briefly speculate on the possibility that we may be in danger of 
pushing our adaptive potential to the limit. He leaves the 
question open, however, and at no time does he suggest that 
solutions to contemporary problems are to be found in the 
knowledge of our genetic heritage.
Whatever our predispositions are, it is clear that they do not 
provide us with specific norms, for these are far too variable to be 
genetically programmed, but de Waal suggests, nevertheless, that 
it is helpful for us to be aware of our predispositions, particularly 
if we are interested in changing the way we are, for 
predispositions may be consciously reinforced or repressed. Being 
something of an optimist, de Waal is inclined to the view that, as 
in gardening, it is usually better to work with nature rather than 
against it. I, for reasons which will appear later, am less inclined 
to optimism.
Before there can be any discussion of the method employed by de 
Waal to achieve his aim, or any assessment of his success in doing 
so, it is necessary to look at what he regards as the prerequisites 
for morality. He consistently identifies four basic traits under 
which he groups other related tendencies. He is not consistent in 
the order he bestows on the traits, but that may be because he 
considers them all equally important. It might well be argued that 
the list is not exhaustive, and it is also possible to point to 
particular human societies which, for one reason or another, 
have not displayed these traits. It would, however, as de Waal 
says, be difficult to imagine human morality without the 
following tendencies and capacities: sympathy, reciprocity, the 
development of social norms and ways of enforcing them, 
mechanisms for the avoidance of conflict and for conflict 
resolution. It is with the examination of these four traits and the 
presentation of evidence for their existence in non-human species 
that most of the book is concerned.
De Waal describes his writing as alternating between stories, 
theories and hard-won data, and he is careful to anticipate and 
forestall any criticisms that might arise simply from the form 
rather than the content of his work. He points out that the book is 
intended for the general reader, and that a single anecdote,
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particularly one supported by an appropriate photograph, can do 
more to demonstrate a capacity than a thousand words of 
explanation. At the same time, he is at pains to include, either in 
the text or in the copious end notes, details of supporting research 
by himself and others. He also includes considerable discussion of 
cognition in non-human animals and of cognitive aspects of 
behaviour, particularly caring behaviour, but he is frank in 
recognising the limits of current knowledge in this particular 
field. While the work is undoubtedly accessible, and displays no 
lack of rigour, there are; however, certain problems with his 
approach, problems which arise from its very success. At the 
conclusion of the work, the reader is left with a vivid impression, 
not of a scholarly argument, but of a series of vignettes. In one 
way this does not matter. The vignettes, after all, illustrate the 
argument just as they were intended to do, but there is a problem 
nonetheless. The problem is one of anthropomorphism, not de 
Waal's anthropomorphism, but the anthropomorphism induced 
in the reader by the stories he tells.
Most of the stories that de Waal tells are stories of chimpanzees. 
There are stories of other species, including some particularly 
memorable ones of whales and elephants, but it is on chimpanzee 
society that de Waal focuses. This is perfectly understandable. The 
chimpanzees and the bonobos are our closest living relatives. 
According to recent DNA analyses we share over ninety-eight 
percent of our genetic material with each of these two apes, but 
the chimpanzees are to be found in greater numbers and have 
been more widely researched, both in captivity and in the wild. 
There could be nowhere better to look for signs of burgeoning 
morality. The trouble is that they are too like us. It is almost 
impossible to read their stories without seeing ourselves in them, 
and some of us may sometimes not like what we see, as I shall 
discuss later.
While I have been careful not to accuse de Waal of 
anthropomorphism, he is very aware that ethologists are often 
criticised for being anthropomorphic or even sentimental, and 
the same criticism is levelled at all those who take their pleasure 
in the observation or company of animals other than human. 
This means that their observations are devalued accordingly. To 
some extent, the validity of de Waal's thesis depends on his 
success in rebutting, in advance, the likely criticisms, and he 
begins this task by admitting that, in his chosen field of cognitive
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ethology, anthropomorphism is almost impossible to avoid 
because the only words we have to discuss animal behaviour are 
words intended for communication about people. The very use of 
such a term as 'reconciliation' is likely to bring an instant charge 
of anthropomorphism, a charge which de Waal chooses not to 
reject. He suggests instead that such anthropomorphism, if this is 
what it is, can be used heuristically and he quotes, with approval, 
the use of the term, 'critical anthropomorphism'.
There is much evidence of primate behaviour which resembles 
reconciliation in humans, and there are several striking examples 
in this work, including examples of reconciliation brought about 
by the intervention of a third party, a peacemaker. I almost spoke 
of a disinterested third party, but, if the peacemaker is female 
and likely to suffer from male aggression in any conflict, there is a 
clear interest in the maintenance of peace within the group.
In order to justify his use of the word, 'reconciliation', de Waal 
looks carefully at its everyday use, and defines reconciliation as a 
reunion between former opponents following an aggressive 
conflict. It is followed by at least a temporary cessation of 
hostilities. If the observed behaviour matches the definition in all 
respects, then the use of the term is justified, even if the 
underlying process is not the same. If it does not, then a new label 
should be sought.
It is highly likely that the underlying processes are, in fact, the 
same too, for the principle of parsimony posits that if closely 
related species act the same way, then it would be uneconomic to 
assume different processes for similar behaviour. There is, 
however, another form of this same principle which de Waal sees 
as posing a problem for him. The principle of parsimony also tells 
us not to invoke higher capacities if a phenomenon can be 
explained with lower ones, and this presumably means that de 
Waal should not invoke complex cognitive abilities in discussing 
such phenomena as reconciliation behaviour in the great apes, 
especially if these abilities are still a matter of hot debate.
There is no doubt that the two faces of the principle of parsimony 
are a source of conflict for Frans de Waal as a cognitive 
ethnologist with a particular interest in understanding the 
cognitive abilities of our nearest relatives, but I would question 
whether the existence of the problem in any way undermines the
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central thesis of this particular work. It is de Waal's contention 
that animals other than ourselves behave in ways which 
resemble human moral behaviour. He produces much evidence 
that this is so, and the force of this evidence is not diminished by 
equally strong evidence that human cognitive evolution has 
advanced further than theirs. It is still more likely than not that 
our similar behaviours have a similar source, and this is 
particularly true of the members of the primate family. In other 
contexts, de Waal has been quick to point out that our reasoning 
capacities do not drive our actions and that we are more given to 
rationalisations after the event than to careful considerations 
beforehand. It would seem that there are, indeed, good grounds 
for the application of the principle of parsimony, but to human 
rather than chimpanzee behaviour, and if, as de Waal asserts, 
there is growing evidence for mental complexity in the 
chimpanzee, then it may be necessary to invoke higher capacities 
in the explanation of such phenomena as chimpanzee 
reconciliation. If this is the only way a satisfactory explanation can 
be found, then there is no infringement of the principle.
It is not my intention to attempt here any detailed examination of 
de Waal's treatment of the four identified prerequisites for 
morality, but I do wish to look rather more closely at one of the 
four, the capacity for sympathy. There are two reasons for doing 
this. Sympathy is generally regarded as the first of the capacities 
necessary for morality, first both in time and in consequence. It is 
also the capacity most often described as 'natural' in both 
literature and philosophy, and is, accordingly, not infrequently 
ascribed to animals other than humans. It is, for example, the 
only virtue allowed by Rousseau to his hypothetical natural man, 
for, as he says, it is so natural that the very beasts themselves 
sometimes give evident proofs of it.
In his discussion of sympathy, de Waal prefers to use the term 
succorance in relation to animals. He regards this as the 
functional equivalent of human sympathy, and defines succorant 
behaviour as helping, caregiving, or providing relief to distressed 
or endangered individuals other than progeny. Succorance may 
be cross-species and may extend to the long-term care of the 
disabled. Succorant behaviour bears a close resemblance to 
parental care, but is found only in those animals which form 
strong attachments. Even in myth and legend, solitary predators
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are not usually endowed with succorance, although they may be 
its beneficiaries.
There is no lack of evidence for the existence of such behaviour, 
and it is not difficult to explain a continuum of nurturance, 
attachment and succorance in purely evolutionary terms. Where 
there is a long period of infant dependence, for example, there are 
obvious advantages in association. What is far more difficult to 
determine is the extent to which cognitive abilities have a role in 
succorant behaviour in both humans and other animals. It may 
be that some caring behaviour, even in humans, is an automatic 
response to a particular stimulus, while some behaviour observed 
in chimpanzees is of such complexity that it is difficult to explain 
unless it is allowed that these animals are capable of forming 
intentions with the other's interests explicitly in mind. On the 
whole, de Waal seems prepared to regard human sympathy as 
simply an enhanced extension of an original tendency found also 
in other animals. While it is, of course, true that humans may be 
able to provide help more efficiently than could another animal, 
it is also true that our cognitive abilities may be used just as 
efficiently to stifle an original impulse. This fact does not, 
however, diminish the likelihood that succorance and sympathy 
have the same origin.
Although I found little to disagree with in de Waal's account of 
the likely evolution of human sympathy, I did not read it without 
some misgivings, misgivings which were not allayed by the 
account of the development of social rule and systems of reward 
and punishment among primates. If sympathy is associated with 
nurturance and so with females as primary or only caretakers of 
the young in virtually all primate species, then the development 
of rule and order is associated with the male, so much so that de 
Waal gives some consideration to gender differences in relation 
to morality.
This is not an oblique accusation of sexism, for my misgivings 
have little to do with anything that de Waal says. On the contrary, 
de Waal makes every effort to show how differences of social 
organisation and relations between the sexes may be traced to 
differences in environmental pressures, and he is particularly 
good at playing the game of the counter example. Whatever 
behaviour he illustrates, he customarily produces an example of 
contrary behaviour in a related species, for he is interested only in
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establishing broad general tendencies, and is much more inclined 
to stress the human capacity for change than to emphasise our 
inescapable genetic heritage. In any case, little of what he says is 
unfamiliar. His achievement lies rather in producing a mass of 
evidence that serves to confirm some of our earlier speculations 
and discount others, and he would be the first to admit that his 
task is far from complete. The notion of gendered morality is 
certainly not new, for it has been the subject of philosophical 
debate and tragic poetry and drama since the time of the Greeks. 
My misgivings have, in fact, far more to do with the chimpanzees 
than de Waal.
In a very recent publication, Bonobo: the forgotten ape, de Waal 
makes the following observation, which merits quotation here.
Had bonobos been known earlier, reconstruction of 
human evolution might have emphasised sexual 
relations, equality between males and females, and the 
origin of the family, instead of war, hunting, tool 
technology, and other masculine fortes.1
The bonobo is just as intelligent as the chimpanzee and just as 
closely related to our species, but it is very different in its 
temperament and habits. More sociable and vocal than the 
chimpanzee, the bonobo rarely engages in any form of physical 
violence and is most notable for the pleasure it takes in frequent 
and extraordinarily variable sexual activity, a pleasure shared 
equally by females and males.
I do not wish to suggest that we are, or should be, more like 
bonobos than chimpanzees, although some of us probably share 
some of their proclivities, but I would suggest that by focusing o n 
chimpanzee society we run the risk of reinforcing behaviour that 
many of us would regard as highly undesirable. Whatever the 
variety of human behaviour and association, there seems little 
doubt that the ethos of late twentieth century capitalist society is 
that of the chimpanzee dominant male. Chimpanzee male society 
is a hierarchical one marked by status-seeking, high levels of 
competition and aggression, including aggression against females, 
and prescriptive rules which are frequently broken. In 
chimpanzee society as a whole, however, there seems to be a 
precarious balance in the relationship between males and females
1 Frans de Waal & Frans Lanting, Bonobo: the forgotten ape, photographs 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997).
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which promotes the well-being of the group. There are several 
instances in Good Matured of females intervening successfully in 
disputes between males, and of males showing caring behaviour 
and tolerance for the transgressions of the young. While I would 
not suggest chimpanzee female behaviour as a model any more 
than male, I would suggest that we may be in some danger of 
losing the balance necessary for our well-being and even, 
ultimately, our survival. I strongly recommend a study of Bonobo  
to quell some of the misgivings to which I have alluded.
In the first paragraph of this essay, I mentioned that de Waal is 
rarely dismissive of the views of others, and he shows familiarity 
with and respect for the work of a number of philosophers. There 
is, however, one exception to this rule, for de Waal exhibits a 
considerable hostility towards the views of Peter Singer, and, in 
particular, towards the proposal contained in a volume called The  
Great Ape Project 2 in which Paola Cavalieri advocate a 
'community of equals' consisting of apes and humans. It is a 
project which de Waal, who manifestly has great affection and 
respect for the great apes, dismisses, in unusually strong erms, as 
showing blatant anthropocentrism and profound 
condenscension.
I have no wish to embark here on a defence of either de Waal or 
Singer in relation to this matter, but, while acknowledging 
Singer's achievements on behalf of animals, I have always been 
puzzled by his dismissive attitude towards those who are 
interested in them. In the preface to the 1975 edition of Animal  
Liberation,3 he makes a point of disavowing any such interest on 
the part of his wife or himself, and he seems to suggest that 
judgments about animals are best made by those of a similar bent. 
Such people may, of course, claim to be truly disinterested, but 
whether lack of knowledge can lead to sound judgments is a 
different matter. It could probably be said that some ethologists 
have displayed excessive enthusiasm and scant consideration for 
the objects of their investigations. I do not believe that these 
charges can be brought against de Waal, and I do believe that 
studies in primatology, such as his, can help us to gain a better 
understanding of both ourselves and our closest relatives. W e
2 Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond 
Humanity (Fourth Estate, London, 1993).
3 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Jonathan Cape, London, 1976).
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may need this understanding to ensure both their survival and 
our own.
On the closing page of the book, De Waal predicts that science will 
soon wrest morality from the hands of the philosophers. I 
interpret this as a rhetorical flourish, but, in any case, some moral 
philosophers of the past fare quite well in the light of de Waal's 
thesis, David Hume, for example, and I doubt if philosophers of 
today will be deterred from thinking about the way things are. 
What can be said is that scientists of de Waal's calibre provide us 
with plenty to think about.
Felicity Sutcliffe
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Book Review
Rogers, Lesley, Minds o f  Their Own: Thinking and Awareness in 
Animals, 212pp., Allen and Unwin, St.Leonards, New South  
Wales, 1997.
T o say of someone that they have a 'mind of their own' is usually to praise them, to imply that they can- think independently. We take the minds of other humans for 
granted, we assume that they have a mind in the first place, 
which can become one's own: but we rarely make such 
assumptions for nonhuman animals. Nonhumans are all too 
often assumed to be mindless automata. 'Minds of their own' is 
thus a title aiming to challenge persistent cultural beliefs about 
other species.
Lesley Rogers is a biologist, whose research focuses on animal 
behaviour. Her particular challenge is to the assumptions made 
by many of her fellow scientists. Those of us trained in the 
science of animal behaviour have been taught not to 
anthropomorphise - that is, we should never generalise from 
human thoughts and feelings to animal behaviour. The trouble 
with consciousness and the notion of mind is that they can't be 
observed, only inferred; hence, we should not attribute 
consciousness to animals, the argument goes.
This scepticism remains a strongly held conviction among many 
scientists. But, Rogers notes, there are increasing numbers of 
biologists who question it, who do seek to find ways to ask about 
animal minds. Her book explores many of the recent findings, 
moving through issues of self-awareness, deception and 
intentionality, questions of intelligence and memory, and the 
relationship between brain size and consciousness. Throughout, 
she gives the benefit of doubt to the animals studied.
Western culture, Rogers points out, is heavily invested in 
defending a boundary between intelligent humans and 
(nonintelligent) other species. Scientists continue this tradition, 
tending to prefer interpretations of behaviour that deny self 
awareness or consciousness. But the boundaries are arbitrary; we 
include humans in consciousness even if they lose the capacity
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for language, yet when nonhumans learn some features of 
human language we search for ways to dismiss their abilities.
Rogers gives many examples of this boundary maintenance. She 
cites, for example, one scientist who insists that even other apes 
cannot access memories independently of triggers in the 
environment. He is not convinced by the many studies of sign- 
language acquisition in apes, even when Koko the gorilla 
expressed past sadness at the death of her companion kitten.
'In the absence of evidence', suggests Rogers, such 
people 'who categorically state that all animals are 
locked into thinking about and responding only to the 
immediate environment, are expressing their attitudes 
to animals, not scientific evidence' (p. 75).
Those who want to maintain a boundary seek all kinds of fence 
posts. Language is one (though challenged by sign-learning 
chimpanzees); tool use is another (also challenged by a range of 
species which use tools). Yet, in her careful analysis of both 
animal abilities and the evidence of early hominid evolution, 
Rogers can find no fences:
'If there is a discontinuity between Homo sapiens and 
other living species', she concludes, 'it does not lie in 
the exclusive possession of any one of these traits'.
We may be better at some things (tool using for instance) but 
there is no evidence of traits exclusive to humans. There is even:
'a continuity of human speech with the brain structures 
that are used for vocalisations in animals. Both stone 
and wooden tools were being used well before humans 
evolved and planning ahead is essential to the survival 
of many species. No single feature on its own makes us 
special' (pp. 163-4).
Not only do prevailing cultural beliefs about the stupidity of 
nonhumans enter scientific interpretations, but the experiments 
themselves are often designed to support them. Can we really 
conclude animal stupidity when we compare humans to animals 
who have spent all their lives in highly impoverished 
environments? It would hardly be surprising if a laboratory- 
reared chimpanzee failed to solve some of the problems it was set; 
so would a human child reared in such dire surroundings.
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The riposte of some scientists is that, to draw proper conclusions, 
we must have properly controlled conditions. On those grounds, 
they reject the interpretations offered by people who have raised 
chimpanzees to use sign language. This, Rogers points out, is:
'a double bind. On the one hand, the rearing and testing 
conditions must be controlled completely or the 
complex cognitive abilities that animals display will not 
be believed. On the other hand, if the rearing and testing 
conditions are controlled completely, the environment 
becomes so sterile that animals raised in it will be less 
able, or willing, to display complex cognitive abilities, 
language abilities and consciousness' (p. 171).
Controlling conditions also means losing the individual. 
Animals become groups in experimental protocols. By contrast, 
those of us who live in close companionship with specific 
individuals of other species - as Rogers does with her Rhodesian 
ridgebacks - know how variable and different they are. Each has 
her or his own personality. I may be a scientist, but I don't need 
science to tell me whether or not my dogs or horses have 
consciousness or understand what I say. My answer comes from 
my own individual experiences with those animals.
Lesley Rogers clearly shares that belief that she is communicating 
with a conscious and aware being when she interacts with her 
dogs, or with the orangutans she has studied in East Malaysia. But 
she does not generally argue from that personal experience; on 
the contrary, she is very careful to examine the evidence from the 
science itself and to question the conclusions of many scientists. 
We could just as well start from the premise of animal awareness, 
she believes, as starting from the prevailing belief in its lack.
Giving nonhuman animals the benefit of the doubt in such ways 
should extend beyond simply interpreting data. If we start from 
the premise that (at least some) animals can be aware, then we can 
allow that some species might be aware of the suffering of their 
fellows. Koko the gorilla, suggests Rogers, exhibited empathy 
toward another gorilla who was crying, apparently to be let out. 
Yet how often is that possibility of empathy ever taken into 
account by those who work with (use) nonhuman animals? Like 
Rogers, I too have often seen other scientists killing rats in front 
of their cagemates; like her, I have wondered, with pain, what
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those other rats were experiencing. Many animals in laboratories 
or farming environments might suffer because of their awareness 
of the suffering or death of their fellows. As Rogers notes:
'None of the present guidelines for animal welfare take 
this into account' (p. 188).
Lesley Rogers makes a persuasive case. At the very least, she 
urges, nonhuman animals should be given the benefit of the 
doubt, not assumed a priori to have no consciousness or minds. 
Her book is, moreover, written accessibly, avoiding the overly 
complicated language beloved of so many scientists. There is a 
great deal invested in maintaining the boundary between 'us 
humans' and 'them', and much of the science is devoted to fence-
building. But even within that science there is growing interest in 
animal minds, and growing resistance to the idea that animals are 
merely clockwork machines.
If we posit other species as mere machines, what does that say 
about ourselves? What does it say about our relationships to 
those other species? Among other things, it limits our 
understandings. Rogers concludes her book:
'By ignoring the most interesting attributes of the 
behaviour of animals we not only diminish our own 
experiences but also diminish the existence of animals.' 
(p. 195).
Other species are adapted to quite different environments to us, 
requiring different skills to negotiate - not lesser, just different. 




Dennett, Daniel, Kinds o f  m inds, x + 244pp., Phoenix, London, 
1996.
Dennett takes up the question of animal minds. Do animals have 
subjective states or are they merely capable of (sometimes) doing 
clever things. His answer is curiously dogmatic. They have no 
subjective states, hence they have no minds. Yet in the same 
breath -the book can be read in almost one breath- he 
acknowledges our ignorance about animals and their capacities. 
The argument appears to be: if we are unsure of the capacities of 
animals then we should say they have no subjectivity, no minds. 
He claims that language gives humans a unique advantage in the 
development of subjectivity but this is not a good argument 
unless we have established that other animals do not have 
'languages'. We do not know this and Dennett does not even 
refer to the studies with dolphins and bonobos which purport to 
show that they have language. This is a profoundly disappointing 
book because a great deal of it simply restates the dogmatisim of 
past philosophy concerning the uniqueness of humans.
Hoeg, Peter, The Woman and the Ape, 229pp. H arvill Press, 
London, 1996.
Two thirds of this book is a wonderful, witty novel full of attacks 
on meat eating, zoos and animal experimentation but with a very 
soft touch. There is a very clever and constant use of animal 
analogies, e.g. 'There is nothing pleasant about abandoning the 
protection afforded by hopes and daydreams and Madelaine 
shrank from it like a hermit crab forced to leave its whelk shell' 
(p.75). It is only after a while that you realise that when an analogy 
is drawn it nearly always involves an animal.The last third of the 
book is a sexual/social fantasy straining all credibility. An ape 
whisks a woman away to a supposedly idyllic garden. Realizing 
the limitations of such a life they return to society draw out other 
(hidden) apes and sail away
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Carruthers, Peter and and Smith, Peter K, editors, Theories o f  
theories o f  mind, xv + 390pp., Cambridge Univesity Press, 
Cambridge, 1996.
The first three parts of this book take up a wide range of debates in 
the philosophy of mind. Part four consists of four articles on 
whether non-human primates have minds. The authors are 
Andrew Whiten (Psychology, St Andrews), Daniel Povinelli 
(Comparative Behavioural Biology, New Iberia Research Center), 
Juan-Carlos Gomez (Psychology, Madrid) and Peter Smith 
(Psychology, Sheffield). Andrew Whiten concentrates on what it 
means to attribute mental states to beings such as chimpanzees. 
Daniel Povinelli tries to show that there are plausible reasons 
why chimpanzees (at least) might have a theory of mind pointing 
to features such as gaze-following and self-recognition in mirrors 
but then he raises some doubts. Shifting the focus onto practical 
understandings of overt mental states as expressed in intelligent 
social action, Gomez argues that what chimpanzees display is 
more complex than trial-and-error but it need not involve a 
meta-representational theory of mind. While Smith asserts that a 
theory of mind cannot exist without language - in the sense of an 
abstract symbolic system of communication. The conclusion to 
the article and the book is quite a telling example of human 
arrogance: 'Only if chimpanzees could talk to each other about 
mental states would they have evolved mind-reading, and only if 
they could talk to us about mental states would we believe them'. 
Hopefully the club of 'we' is diminishing.
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